



Airwave Tactical Guidance

Firearms Incident Escalation:

Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA)
MTA on a Moving Train
Terrorist Siege
Op Temperer

Airwave Tactical Advice

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This document updates and replaces "Airwave Briefing 03/2016 - Firearms Incident Escalation: Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack (MTFA), Siege, Op Temperer, Moving Train"

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Date: 6th January 2021

Version: 5.1

Distribution: All Police Control Room Staff, all Police Airwave Teams, All Airwave Communications Tactical Advisors and Managers, Police Operational Planners.

Handling Instructions:

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Document Control

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This document builds on an original by Trevor Winterbottom and revisions by Inspector Thomasina Howe and Inspector Ian McAtamney.

Issue Control:		
Version	Date	Description
0.1		Original draft
V1.0	01/10/2015	Approved version.
V2.0	12/01/2016	Title changed and re-write to align with NPCC FA protocols
V3.0	07/03/2016	Re write following complete review with NPCC FA.
V3.1	04/04/2016	Minor amendments, grammar and references to HO forces.
V3.2	20/05/2106	Re write, changes to recommended groups and compliance with NPCC Armed Policing APPs.
V4.0 V4.1 V4.2	02/08/2018 to 10/05/2019	Re-write to reflect recent Policing events and updated CTA advice.
V4.3	20/05/2019	Minor amendments and alignment with "Plato"
V5.0	31/10/2020	Significant changes throughout whole document.
V5.1	06/10/2020	Change in name of DMO talk group PDM NATFA 2 to PDM FA 2E in section 3.2 and Appendix D.

This document replaces the Home Office document "Airwave Briefing 03/2016 - Firearms Incident Escalation: Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack (MTFA), Siege, Op Temperer, Moving Train".

Copies of the older briefing should be withdrawn with immediate effect and replaced with this document. Local force policy in this area should be reviewed in line with this document.



Controlling Documentation

Source documentation used to produce this document includes:

Communications Tactical Advisor Course content and governance documents 2018.
These documents are available from the College of Policing.

National Fleetmap Configuration Guidance, published February 2015.



Communication Tactical Advisor Governance Terms of Reference, version 4 - initially published June 2018.



College of Policing National Decision Model Authorised Professional Practice:
<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/>





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Glossary

This glossary provides guidance on terms used in this document – it is not a detailed glossary for either Airwave or Armed Policing policy and practice.

Acronym or term	Full title
Airwave	UK National emergency services radio network
Bronze (Bx)	Operational level in the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure, often abbreviated to Bx.
BRM	Business Relationship Manager - Airwave staff responsible for maintaining relationship with customers
BTP	British Transport Police
Covert Airwave	Airwave radios using end to end encryption issued to some specialist users
CTA	Communications Tactical Advisor. Formerly known as Airwave Tactical Advisor or Operational Communications Advisor.
CTPOR	Counter Terrorism Police Operations Room
CTSFO	Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officer
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FIM	Force Incident Manager
FTA	Firearms Tactical Advisor
Gold (Gx)	Strategic level in the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure, often abbreviated to Gx.
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authorities
MTA	Marauding Terrorist Attack
MTA JOPs	Responding to A Marauding Terrorist Attack: Joint Operating Principles For The Emergency Services JESIP Guidance
NMC	Network Management Centre (Airwave)
NPCC	National Police Chief's Council
OCiP	Operational Communications in Policing - division of the NPCC with responsibility for oversight and support of Airwave nationally.
Operation Plato	Multi-Agency response to an ongoing MTA
Operation Temperer	Mass conventional military armed support to Police in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack or threat level rise to CRITICAL.
OFC	Operational Firearms Commander
Overt Airwave	Standard Airwave radios issued to the majority of users
PLO	Police Liaison Officer - Police Officer on secondment to OCiP, providing support to forces
PMA	Police Mutual Aid - A set of talkgroups retained by the Home Office to facilitate mutual aid deployments
Silver (Sx)	Tactical level in the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure, often abbreviated to Sx
SFC	Strategic Firearms Commander
SMU	Specialist Military Units
Talk group	An assigned communications group that makes radios act as if all users on the same group were using the same channel
TFC	Tactical Firearms Commander



1. Overview and Purpose

It is recognised that a marauding terrorist attack may be an extraordinary event with unprecedented demands placed upon all aspects of the policing (and emergency service partners) response and the supporting systems. This document seeks to update and bring together previously circulated advice and guidance for the use of Airwave during an MTA, including on a moving train, where a vehicle pursuit is involved or a siege situation develops. It also provides advice in respect of the use of Airwave during an activation of Operation Temperer. Each of these situations has its own national guidance which this document is designed to complement and support. Nothing in this document is intended to deviate from the advice and guidance provided in those source documents which include:

- “National Operation Plato Guidance” and the “Responding To A Marauding Terrorist Attack: Joint Operating Principles For The Emergency Services” (MTA JOPs) documents which cover the response to an MTA.
- The “Armed Cross Boundary Protocol between the British Transport Police and National Police Chiefs Council” covers the response to an MTA on a moving train.
- “Temperer – Police National Operational Plan” is the national guidance document for Operation Temperer.
- The “Operational Citadel” document provides the national guidance in respect of managing a terrorist siege situation.

The Airwave Network (“Airwave”), as the primary critical communications system for all three UK Emergency Services will underpin any operational and tactical response from the three Emergency Services. Effective management and use of Airwave will ensure that communications are maintained for all, supporting the response and that the Communications Tactical Advisor (CTA) is able to offer proactive options. Conversely the failure to consider Airwave may lead to disruption and even failures of the network, endangering the safest and earliest resolution of the incident. The CTA may find that they are responding to avoidable “reactive” issues that have already impacted on the response.

For Airwave and from the perspective of a CTA and users, there are several particularly challenging aspects:

- The initial response will be local, but escalation may be regional or national.
- Mutual aid, particularly firearms officers, may be spontaneously deployed.
- Overt and covert Airwave resources may be deployed.
- Command and control may transfer from overt Control Room(s) to Covert Operations Room(s) or become a joint venture.
- Although interoperability exists between overt and covert Airwave users, there are limitations to the number of talk groups that can be accessed by covert users.
- The physical Airwave infrastructure will have capacity restrictions, particularly in rural areas, on the number of talk groups and users that can be accommodated at any one time.

Also included in this document is guidance on the involvement of the military personal in an MTA under the Military Aid to Civil Authorities agreement which could include [Specialist Military Units](#) (to assist in resolving an incident) or an [Operation Temperer \(mass military support to Police\) deployment](#).



Lastly there is guidance for an incident on a moving or stationary train or on other land or property within British Transport Police (BTP) jurisdiction.

Appended to this document are several documents which may assist a CTA who is called upon to advise in an MTA, the [Role of the Communications Tactical Advisor](#), [MTA Phases and Quick Reference Guide](#), [Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir](#), [Talk Group Availability Across Different Agencies](#) and [Event Planning Guidance](#).

This document is primarily aimed at Police CTAs. Their managers, Police Control Room Supervisors and managers are **strongly advised** to familiarise themselves with the contents of this document. This document is also relevant and should be made available to:

- Police control room staff.
- Police Airwave support teams
- Police operational planners
- Tactical Firearms Commanders
- Firearms Tactical Advisors
- Communications Tactical Advisors from other Emergency Services

All decisions **should** be made and reviewed in line with the College of Policing National Decision Model.



The NDM has six key elements. Each component provides the user with an area for focus and consideration. The element that binds the model together is the Code of Ethics at the centre. Any Police Officer or member of Police Staff should have a working knowledge of this model before being placed in a decision-making role.



2. Marauding Terrorist Attack

An MTA may take many forms, ranging from a low sophistication attack (for example a single subject using a bladed article or vehicle to injure or kill) through to a multi sited firearms and/or IED attack involving multiple individuals (MTFA).

Operation PLATO is the agreed national identifier for the multi-agency response to an ongoing MTA. A PLATO declaration may generate the need for the deployment of additional armed officers, cross boundary, both regionally and nationally.

2.1. Police Control Room - Initial Actions

An MTA may initiate a large volume of calls/contact from the public into all three emergency services. It is essential that all police staff receiving incoming calls have an awareness of the potential indicators that an MTA may be taking place. These may include reports of:

- Subject(s) armed with bladed weapons
- Use of a moving vehicle as a weapon
- Use of firearms which may include high velocity military style weapons
- Use of improvised explosive devices and/or military grenades

There may be initial confusion around the location(s) and nature of incident(s) and multiple incident logs created from what might be conflicting information or accurate but evolving updates from the public.

Notification to the Airwave National Management Centre will activate network monitoring systems and major incident processes.

Note that there will be a range of priority actions to be completed by staff within the police control room, including contacting relevant Ambulance and Fire Services and possibly other Police Forces including the British Transport Police for incidents on the national rail network.

These control room actions and the methods to be employed are detailed within the “National Operation Plato Guidance” document and not repeated in this document which focuses on Airwave.

On receipt of information that an MTA may be taking place, the Control Room Supervisor should, as a priority action, contact the Airwave Network Management Centre (NMC) on:

0800 085 9995

- Use the phrase **“This is a Police Major Incident”** to activate the correct response from Airwave
- Give the **location** of the incident(s)
- Record the **Airwave Reference Number**



The initial response to an incident will be on local talk groups however it is likely that this will be quickly overwhelmed. Unarmed responders may become involved and seek urgent assistance. Despatchers may be placed under intense pressure as they try to support an effective response at the same time as multiple users may make repeated use of their emergency button which cannot be suspended. This can lead to issues with Airwave network capacity.

Whilst each force will have contingency plans to manage a response to an MTA they **should** be based on national guidance. The guidance contained within this document in respect of Airwave communications **should** be followed in order to support an effective communications plan.

Any cross-boundary assets assigned (e.g. armed response vehicles) **should** use nationally approved talk groups such as NATFA 1 and 2.

Force contingency plans will also address management of other demand at this time. Depending on the scale of the incident, the capability of the force concerned and level of demand, response policing could be effectively suspended, either by policy or the sheer impact of the incident. The force may be restricted, for example to answering only Grade 1 (priority) calls.

Airwave talk group interoperability exists between overt and covert Airwave users but there are limitations to the amount of talk groups covert radios can access. [See Appendix D – Talk Group Availability Across Different Agencies.](#)

Physical local restrictions, dependent upon the size and capacity of the local Airwave infrastructure, will impact on the number of talk groups and users that can be concurrently serviced in any one location.

A CTA can assist with advice and guidance on coverage, capacity and talk group availability across all possible responders.

Police Control Room supervisors should rapidly develop an awareness of the coverage and capacity of the Airwave network at the incident location(s) and take steps to ensure that the network is not overloaded.

Users, both overt and covert, must be made aware at the earliest opportunity of their possible impact to the network, for example, the importance of radio discipline and selecting the correct talk group before arrival at scene.

The Control Room Supervisor should, at the earliest possible time, appoint a CTA to advise on the use of Airwave who can be tasked with management of these issues.

The CTA **should not** be given secondary duties as this can detract from their primary role.



2.2. Communications Tactical Advisor – initial actions

As soon as a CTA is assigned to this role, they **should** rapidly assess the situation and begin a log of decisions and actions which will assist in any handover to another CTA or with post-incident debriefing and review. The log **should** include the time they were appointed and other tasks they are expected to carry out in parallel.

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors

As soon as a CTA is appointed it is likely that they will take control of the issues in the “Police Control Room – Initial Actions” section (2.1) of this document and the newly appointed CTA **should** confirm that all have been completed. In particular:

- **Contact NMC on 0800 085 9995** to confirm that NMC are aware of the incident. The CTA **MUST** use the phrase **“This is a Police Major Incident”** and give the **location** of the incident(s) to NMC. Ensure NMC are updated with critical information, particularly if the incident location changes and how to contact the CTA.
- **The CTA should rapidly develop an awareness of the coverage and capacity of the Airwave network at the incident location(s) and take steps to ensure that the network is not overloaded. Restrictions may be needed on the number of talk groups in use, peer to peer (private) calls and telephony.**
- **Users, both overt and covert, should be made aware at the earliest opportunity of their possible impact to the network, for example, the importance of radio discipline and selecting the correct talk group before arrival at scene. This will continue throughout the incident.**
- Consider contacting a Covert Communications Tactical Advisor.
- **Where other forces or agencies are involved, contact their control in order to brief their CTA where possible.**
- Consider early requests for Airwave assets or network enhancements.
- If other areas of the force are continuing to work on unrelated activities and where appropriate, these **should** be moved to alternative talk groups not likely to be needed for the management of the primary incident.
- Talk groups **should not** be patched as this has the potential to create issues with transmissions. Where patches have already been put in, these **should** be replaced with more appropriate arrangements and patches removed as soon as possible. **Covert Police and some Military (SMUs and EOD) radios will not work on patched talk groups.**
- **Contact local Airwave support teams for support.** These teams could be tasked with confirming coverage situation and capacity limits for serving cell sites for the relevant location(s) as well as ongoing monitoring.
- If available, use Insite to monitor the performance of the Airwave Network. If you do not have access, faster and more regular contact with NMC will be essential.
- Be prepared to **stun radios** that disrupt group communications and where attempts to resolve the situation have failed.



- Initial armed response will be managed via NATFA talk groups (PFFFF NATFA 1 or 2) of the force with primacy. Firearms mutual aid **should** be directed to select the appropriate talk group as soon as possible and always before arriving on scene to avoid talk group dragging.
- Should two NATFA talk groups be insufficient, the primary additional options are the controlling force INTOP 1 talk group (PFFFF INTOP 1). Talk Groups INTOP 2 and 3 can also be used but note that there is no guaranteed access for SMUs to those talk groups.
- INTOP 1 and 2 are designated for pursuit management but it is assumed that an MTA will take precedence. Officers not engaged on this incident **should** be made aware these talk groups are not available for pursuits.
- Should further talk groups be required then controlling force EVENT talk groups (PFFFF EVENT) can be used. If this is the case, then Firearms Commanders **should** be made aware that SMUs and elements of the national CTSFO network may not be able to access these talk groups. Overt radios can but **not all Covert radios have this capability**.
- EVENT Talk Groups may also be in demand for supporting the police operation including outer cordons, traffic management etc.
- Alert managers to the need to activate and supply staff to manage additional talk groups for issues including mutual aid and multi-agency working.
- The controlling force Police Hailing Group (PFFFF HG1) is permanently monitored but sometimes in addition to other tasks. During an MTA, where mutual aid may be coming from other forces to support, the hailing group may become significantly busier.
- Where incoming Mutual Aid resources are replacing resources previously deployed on local talk groups, this offers an opportunity to deploy Mutual Aid on National talk groups. See [Appendix D – Talk Group availability across Different Agencies](#).

3. Multi-Agency Considerations

Any response to an MTA will include all three emergency services as well as a range of other Category 1 and 2 responders (as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act). The response to an MTA may also include SMUs or other elements of the military.

3.1. Civilian Services Interoperability

Interoperability between forces, other emergency services and responders is facilitated using Airwave with the following talk groups:

Emergency Services Inter Control Room – ESCTRL – are Ambulance Service owned talkgroups (one per Ambulance Service region) that provide the 3 Emergency Services control rooms with the ability to notify each other and share information in response to a wide variety of major and / or critical incidents. Early and ongoing information sharing between the Emergency Services control rooms and their services responders is an essential requirement in delivering a coordinated response (in line with the METHANE mnemonic).

Incident Command - IC 1 (PFFFF IC1) **should** be used for Emergency Service / Multi-Agency Incident Command talk group providing interoperability at tactical command (silver)



level between police and approved other organisations such as fire and ambulance services. (London has IC1 and 2, Scotland has IC1, 2, and 3).

Emergency Services - ES 1 – 3 (PFFFF ES 1 – 3, 1 – 6 in London, 1 – 12 in Scotland) are force owned talk groups intended for Emergency Service / Multi-Agency Incident Command, providing interoperability at operational command (bronze) level on the ground between police and other organisations such as fire and ambulance services – for example to coordinate rescue and recovery.

Police Mutual Aid - PMA 81 – 90 (PMA 81 – 90) are Home Office owned national Multi-Agency Incident Management talk groups however need to be opened for use by NMC. For advance events, booking of PMAs is through your force PLO representative. For spontaneous, out of hours or urgent requests, this is done through NMC. You will be given a PMA relevant to your area.

Multi Agency Mutual Aid - MAMA 1 – 10 (XMAMA 1 – 10) are Airwave owned national talk groups suitable for interoperability with ANY organisation that possesses Airwave radios. XMAMA 1 is always available for spontaneous events. The remainder are allocated to geographic regions and can be booked in the same way as PMAs.

Inter-Agency Talk Group – IAT1 (XFFF IAT 1) are Airwave owned talk groups linked to each territorial force area and suitable for interoperability with ANY organisation that possesses Airwave radios. They are always available for spontaneous events.

For more information on all the above talk groups, availability across agencies and regional allocations, see [Appendix C – Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir](#) and [Appendix D – Talk Group availability across Different Agencies](#).

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors

IC, ES, MAMA and IAT are the primary talk groups for multi-agency interoperability. The actual choice of talk group will depend on the purpose and the agencies interoperability is required with.

When an incident occurs, it is good practice to contact NMC and ask for a multi-agency PMA to be enabled which can then sit furloughed until needed if, for any reason, the primary multi agency groups are not available on all handsets in use.

As with all talk group decisions it is essential that the CTA takes into account the capacity of the serving cell sites to cope with the number of talk groups being used.

3.2. Specialist Military Unit Interoperability

SMUs may be called upon to assist in the resolution of an Operation Plato incident.

Incoming SMU resources will normally receive a face to face briefing from the police Tactical Firearms Commander. If this is not possible then the SMU commander will use the local force HG1 to make initial contact and agree the use of the SFBRIEF talk group (PFFFF SFBRIEF) to facilitate contact between the Police TFC and SMU Commander.

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors

Should there be a need for further interoperability between police and SMU, other options with suggested examples are:



- Police Hailing Group (PFFFF HG1) for initial contact whilst on route.
- NATFA 1 and 2 (PFFFF NATFA 1 and 2) to gain situational awareness whilst on route and for operational use if direct intervention is likely.
- Air to Ground (PFFFF A2G 1) will facilitate interoperability with NPAS Aircraft for either tactical or de-confliction purposes.
- PDM FA 2 E for Direct Mode communications.

See [Appendix D – Talk Group Availability Across Different Agencies for further guidance.](#)

4. Incident Developments

It may be that an MTA develops into a vehicle pursuit, a siege situation or some form of planned intervention.

4.1. Pursuit

It is possible that suspects may make off in a vehicle(s) and a pursuit may result. If a pursuit crosses into a neighbouring force area, officers who have followed the suspects may remain on their original talk group and under the command and control of the original Controlling Force until a formal handover (if appropriate) can be made.

The key Airwave challenge will be to manage a transfer of control from the original to the new controlling force and appropriate talk groups.

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors

- Pursuing officers **should** use an INTOP talk group to ensure other forces can monitor communications from ICCS positions.
- Advise Control Room staff in the receiving force to monitor appropriate talk groups from the original force – using ICCS if possible but fixed mobiles or handheld devices if not.
- The new controlling force **should** establish a supporting communications plan using the steps above, including the appointment of their own CTA.
- Original responders will need to change to the new Controlling Force talk groups if they remain as part of the incident response.
- The original Controlling Force **should** allow for the possibility of their talk group(s) being in use in the neighbouring force area, with the original firearms command structure until such time there is a tactical opportunity to change talk groups.
- The CTA from the original controlling force **should** handover to the new CTA.



4.2. Terrorist Siege

A siege situation could take place at any stage of an MTA or may result from a police operation to contain terrorists into a location. It is also possible that a pursuit and decamp could have taken place prior to suspects taking refuge in a location.

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors

- The establishment of a siege could be the first practical opportunity to move from local talk groups to national ones, if not already done so. This is a higher priority as more specialist resources, including SMUs, may become involved. [Appendix C –Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir](#) and [Appendix D – Talk Group availability across Different Agencies](#).
- Command and Control may pass from a local Control Room to a Counter Terrorism Police Operations Room (CTPOR) or become a joint enterprise.
- The overt police firearms operation **should** use NATFA 1, NATFA 2, and INTOP 1, 2 and 3 at the scene.
- Forces **MUST** use NATFA 1 and 2 where they are supporting SMU action.
- Care **should** be exercised if covert users are engaged operationally on these groups as it will be very difficult for them to change talk group folders without withdrawing from deployment for a short period of time.

4.3. Planned Intervention

If sole responsibility for intervention is handed to the SMU, they will typically move to military communications systems once authorised to proceed.

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors

- Planned intervention, if done by police, **should** be managed on national talk groups to facilitate overt police mutual aid if used.
- Where any sort of joint military and police action is undertaken, the host force CTA **should** select talk groups that facilitate both interoperability and remote monitoring by resources not in the host force control room. [Appendix C –Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir](#) and [Appendix D – Talk Group availability across Different Agencies](#).

5. Operation Temperer

Operation Temperer is a joint police / military contingency operation providing mass military armed support to police in extreme national emergency circumstances. The military retain a stock of Airwave radios for use in these circumstances. The plan consists of a number of separate elements. These include:

Backfill – Deployment of military personnel at identified Ministry of Defence Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary sites to release armed police officers to support Home Office police forces.



Augmentation – Deployment of military personnel alongside armed police officers at key high footfall locations (e.g. shopping centres, transport hubs) across the country.

Temperer Standby Battalions – Deployment of significant numbers of military personnel to undertake specific operations (e.g. to search large open areas for suspects).

If “Op Temperer” is activated it will be beneficial for a CTA at each force using Military resources to review numbers and locations of the incoming assets to consider possible affiliation and congestion issues before they happen and offer Commanders pre-emptive mitigating options.

An MTA that takes place whilst Temperer units are deployed raises additional complexities with interoperability. Temperer military radios are programmed with some interoperability talk groups (IC, ES, A2G, GOV and IAT) but use force EVENT and PMA talk groups for operational deployments. See [Appendix C – Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir](#) and [Appendix D – Talk Group availability across Different Agencies](#).

6. Attack on a Train

NOTE: THE RAILWAY IS A DANGEROUS PLACE AND NO STAFF SHOULD ACCESS THE RAILWAY WITHOUT A CLEAR AUTHORISATION FROM NETWORK RAIL. TREAT ALL LINES AS LIVE. NEVER STEP ON ANY RAIL.

Should an MTA occur on a moving or stationary train or on other land or property within British Transport Police (BTP) jurisdiction, there are further considerations regarding coordination between BTP and other control rooms and officers.

The “Armed Cross Boundary Protocol between the BTP and National Police Chiefs Council” provides the definitive guidance in respect of the response to an MTA within BTP jurisdiction.

Depending on the speed and location of a moving train it is wholly probable that more than one police force control room will be aware of an incident and may be simultaneously attempting to ascertain more details and provide an appropriate response. Initially there may be confusing or conflicting information reaching more than one police control room. Additionally, other emergency service control rooms may also be receiving related calls.

The BTP control room should be in a position to maintain effective communication, through rail industry operations centres or directly, with the relevant train crews and will be in receipt of information from a number of other sources that may not be immediately available to firearms commanders in other forces. Therefore, until the train has come to a stop and its exact location has been identified, BTP will assume responsibility for command, control and coordination of the police response. Once the train has come to a stop and its exact location established, the territorial force in whose area it is located will assume primacy in respect of the command, control and coordination of the incident.

Guidance for Communications Tactical Advisors and Control Room Supervisors

- Where a territorial force needs to contact the BTP, that force **should** use the BTP Hailing Group - **PBTP – HG1**.
- Where the BTP needs to contact a territorial force, the BTP **should** use that force Hailing Group – **PFFFF – HG1**.



The BTP TFC (FIM) **should** direct a change from the BTP Hailing Group to an appropriate dedicated talk group as soon as practicable. However, given the collapsing time frame of such incidents it may be appropriate to coordinate initial activity on the Hailing Group, until such a point that it becomes practicable to change. Once this change of talk group is made, the BTP Hailing Group must continue to be monitored in the BTP control room so that other forces who make contact can be immediately directed to join the identified dedicated talk group.

PMA 75 is permanently enlivened and reserved to spontaneously support the initial response between the BTP and relevant territorial forces in suspected MTA incidents. Therefore **PMA 75** is likely to be the talk group that the BTP TFC (FIM) nominates as the dedicated group to move to at an appropriate point. As a National Forces Mutual Aid talk group, it should be in the handsets, vehicle sets and appropriate ICCS positions for all forces. **All forces must retain a method of accessing PMA75 within their control rooms in case of MTA on a train.**

- Agree with the BTP how ongoing interoperability and information exchange will take place.
- Note that PMA 75 is not routinely monitored by any force. Forces need to agree with each other to use it before they do.
- **If the location of the static train is rural, Airwave capacity management will be critical.** All units **MUST** be advised to select the right talk group some distance **BEFORE** arriving on scene to avoid talk group dragging.
- Once the train has come to a stop and its exact location established, the territorial force in whose area it is located will assume primacy in respect of the command, control and coordination of the incident. At this point the relevant territorial police force TFC (FIM) will direct, based upon Airwave tactical advice, which talk groups will be utilised for ongoing management of the incident in line with their existing local tri-service MTA plans.
- Depending on the requirement for other forces and agencies to join, options for Airwave interoperability with the BTP include:

- Force INTOP talk groups
- Geographic PMA talk groups 1 – 30 and 51 - 70
- Force EVENT talk groups
- Force NATFA talk groups
- National Forces Interoperability PMA 71 – 75
- Police Force IC1 talk group
- Police Force ES talk groups
- National Multi Agency interoperability PMA 81 – 90
- IAT talk group
- MAMA talk groups



Appendices

There are five appendices:

- A. [Role of the Communications Tactical Advisor](#)
- B. [MTA Phases and Quick Reference Guide](#)
- C. [Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir](#)
- D. [Talk Group Availability Across Different Agencies](#)
- E. [Event Planning Guidance](#)

Appendix A – The Role of the Communications Tactical Advisor

The Communications Tactical Advisor will be responsible to their operational and planning teams, providing advice and best practice guidance on all aspects of pre-planned and spontaneous operational use of Airwave.

They will have a high level of understanding of the provisions made for the tactical use of mandated and mutual aid talk groups, together with the Airwave service requirements around major incident and event planning.

In practice, the role involves:

- Giving advice regarding the capacity and capability of Airwave;
- Raising awareness of the limitations of Airwave;
- Highlighting the importance of non-essential function use.

For them to be effective, the Tactical Advisor must be invited to participate at the very earliest stages of major event planning and similarly be invited to assist where protracted spontaneous incidents are encountered in control rooms.



Appendix B – MTA phases and quick reference guidance

Phase	Action	Talk Groups	Notes
Initial Calls	Immediate Response	Local BAU groups and NATFA TG if firearms deployed	
Escalation	Move to Nationally available groups.	NATFA 1 or NATFA2, expand to INTOP 1, 2 and 3	
Temperer Live?	Check if attack is on Temperer protected premises.	EVENT Groups may already be supporting this deployment.	Event groups not generally in E2E covert radios. E2E radios will not operate in patched groups. (will change 2020)
Escape / Pursuit	Incident to remain on original host force groups, irrespective of any relocation.	Use INTOP for pursuit if possible. Maintain established talk groups until formal command handover has taken place.	May require use of Fixed Mobile or hand-held radios in control rooms.
Decamp in neighbours force area	As above.		Every effort should be made to seek support from local controllers with knowledge of area, via Fixed Mobiles or Hand-Held radios.
Incident goes 'local' in new force area	Contact CTA in new host area control room if possible		Manage transfer of control from the original to new force – see Section 4 – Incident Developments
Siege		NATFA 1 or 2 or INTOP 1, 2 and 3	Firearms command to recognise need for use of NATFA if MACA called for SMU support.
Intervention	Police Only	NATFA 1 or 2 or INTOP 1, 2, and 3	Firearms command to recognise need for use of NATFA if MACA called for SMU support.
Transfer of Command to CTPOR	Covert Overt Interop	NATFA1, NATFA2, INTOP 1, 2 and 3	
Intervention	SMU called	As appropriate: PFFFF SFBRIEF for live briefing NAT FA talk groups for tactical or joint working with Overt and Covert	
Moving Train	Hail BTP	Use BTP HG1 or BTP Control Room phone	May already be active if other forces are receiving 999 calls as train moves across counties.



Appendix C – Communications Tactical Advisor Aide Memoir

BR SITES					POLICE MANDATORY TALK GROUPS				
Time slots					Min 33 per force + all PMA TGs				
Voice slots					+ = Some forces have more than minimum				
Control Channel					* = Airwave owned TG, in many agency radios, not to be used for sensitive comms				
IP data					# = Only in relevant handsets				
TALK GROUP PRIORITY	0	2	4 & 5	8 & 9	HG 1	Police Hailing			
	Highest	Silver & Firearms	Primary TGs	P2P & Telephony		SHG 1	Sharers Hailing		
TACTICAL OPTIONS	Coverage		Capacity		INTOP 1-4	Interop (Cross Border)			
	Immediate	DMO only DMO into Gateway	Reduce number of TGs Limit P2P Limit telephony		IC 1	+ Incident Command (Sx)			
Emergency (6hrs)	Mobile Base Station (MBS)	Temporary Additional Capacity (TAC)		ES 1 – 3	+ Emergency Services (Bx)				
Pre-planned	Special Coverage	TAC Technical and Operation Support		IAT 1	* Inter Agency				
NETWORK RESILIENCE		Impact			A2G 1	Air 2 Ground			
Local Site Trunking		Local service only			PROT 1	# Specialist Protection			
Ground Based Network Resilience		Guaranteed vehicle coverage only			NATFA 1 – 2	# National Firearms			
Cluster Hot Standby		Operation Soundwave 2-3 minutes outage			EVENT 1 – 6	+ Force Event			
					GOV 1 – 2	Gov'tment Interoperability			
					MAMA 1 - 10	* Multi Agency Mutual Aid			
					Police Mutual Aid TGs				
					PMA TGs are divided into Primary (see below) and National PMA functions				
					National PMA TG allocations				
					PMA 31 – 50	Administrative			
					PMA 71 – 75	National Forces Mutual Aid			
					PMA 76 – 80	Specialist Mutual Aid			
					PMA 81 – 90	Multi-Agency Incident Mgt			
					PMA 91	Travelling (quiet)			
Primary (Geographic) PMA, Multi Agency PMA and MAMA Talk Group Allocation by Force									
Forces					Primary PMA TGs	Multi Agency PMA	MAMA		
Avon and Somerset, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Cleveland, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Durham, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Northumbria, Nottinghamshire, Suffolk, Thames Valley, West Mercia, Wiltshire.					1 - 10	81 - 82	2 - 3		
Cheshire, Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, Merseyside, North Wales, Northamptonshire, South Wales, South Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Midlands, West Yorkshire.					11 - 20	83 - 84	4 - 5		
Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Essex, Hampshire, Kent, Surrey, Sussex.					21 - 30	85 - 86	6 - 7		
Scotland.					51 - 60	87 - 88	4 - 5		
City of London, Metropolitan.					61 - 70	89 - 90	6 - 7		



Appendix D - Talk Group Availability Across Different Agencies

Different agencies and units within the police forces can have different talk groups available within their standard radio fleetmaps. Whilst there are exceptions to these rules, this table is a good general rule of thumb.

Key	Normally available	Not available	See notes
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Talk Group	Police Overt	Police Covert	Specialist Military Units	Military / Op Temperer
PFFFF HG1				
PFFFF SHG1				
PFFFF A2G 1				
PFFFF INTOP 1				
PFFFF INTOP 2				
PFFFF INTOP 3				
PFFFF NATFA 1	See note 1			
PFFFF NATFA 2	See note 1			
PDM FA 2 E	See note 1			
PDM OPS 1E				
PFFFF EVENT GROUPS		See note 2		
PFFFF PROT 1	See note 1			
PFFFF SFBRIEF	See note 1			
PFFFF IC1				
PFFFF ES 1 2 and 3				
PFFFF GOV 1 and 2				
PFFFF IAT 1				
PMA 1 to 70			See note 3	
PMA 71 to 75				
PMA 76 to 80	See note 1			
PMA 81 to 90				


Note 1 – These talk groups are only in relevant handsets, e.g. NATFA are only in Firearms handsets.

Note 2 – Handsets will have, for most forces, PFFFF EVENT 1 – 3, however in forces where the numbering structure is different (e.g. starts at 10), handsets will normally have the first three EVENT talk groups (e.g. 10, 11 and 12). All handsets will have ALL London (PLON EVENT) talk groups.

Note 3 – Will have access from Q4 2020.



Appendix E - Event Planning Guidance



OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

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