Bristol City Council

Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Plan
October 2025

Document Control

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Details of changes should be sent to:

Emergency Preparedness & Resilience Team (100TS),
Bristol City Council,
PO Box 3399
Bristol, BS1 9NE

Or via email to: emergency.planning@bristol.gov.uk

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The plan will be reviewed at least every three years, as a result of; lessons identified after an activation event or exercise; following major changes of personnel, policy or MAHP locations; following advice and guidance of the HSE or EA; or a change in legislation.

Plan History	Version	Date	Author
Plan Reviewed & Republished	7.0	October 2025	Megan Pillinger
Plan Reviewed & Republished	6.0	August 2022	Nigel Parsons
Plan Reviewed & Republished	5.0	April 2019	Andy Bruce
Plan Reviewed & Republished	4.0	July 2016	Andy Bruce
Plan Reviewed & Republished	3.0	April 2013	Nigel Parsons
Plan Reviewed & Republished	2.0	September 2009	Nigel Parsons
First Publication	1.0	November 2005	Jane Grey

Contents

Index of Figures

Glossary

This plan does not contain a glossary. All abbreviations are written in full the first time of use and any specific terminology is defined / explained in the text of the plan.

The Lexicon of Civil Protection Terminology can be found on the Cabinet Office UK Resilience webpage: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon

Part One: General Arrangements

1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 Legislative Requirements

The Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 places a legislative duty on Bristol City Council (BCC) to prepare a multi-agency emergency plan for pipelines which have the potential to cause a major accident. The regulations apply to all pipelines conveying dangerous fluids, defined by Schedule 2 of the regulations and referred to as Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP).

Any incident on a MAHP, or distribution pipeline connected to a MAHP, is likely to cause an incident of disastrous consequence to Bristol. Members of the public could be fatally hurt, residential and business properties and sites of historic and environmental importance may be seriously disrupted or destroyed.

1.1.2 Liability

This document has been prepared on the basis of information provided to the Council by pipeline operators regarding the nature, extent and likely effects of a major accident involving their pipelines.

The information contained in this document should only be used for the purpose of enabling the appropriate response to be made in the event of a major accident occurring on one of the pipelines referenced in Part 3 or 4 of this plan.

It should be stressed that pipeline hazards are the responsibility of the pipeline operator and although the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 require the Council to produce this plan, no liability arising as a result of negligence or any other cause whatsoever will be accepted by the Council in respect of any claim for damages following a major accident and the use of this plan.

1.1.3 Aim

The aim of this emergency plan is to provide details of the arrangements and actions to be taken to minimise the consequences to the health and safety of members of the public and responding agencies in the event of an emergency involving a MAHP.

1.1.4 Objectives

The objectives of this plan are:

- To outline the arrangements in place to manage a pipeline incident, and identify the responsibilities of the key agencies involved
- To identify the measures necessary to contain and minimise the effects of an incident, both realised and potential, reducing the risk of injury to members of the public and responding agencies
- To provide details of communications in order to provide prompt and appropriate information between key responding agencies including the pipeline operator, the media and members of the public
- To outline arrangements for recovery: to restore and clean up the environment enabling those affected to return as soon as is appropriate
- To be compatible with all relevant emergency plans held by key responding agencies.

1.1.5 Outline of Pipeline Area

Natural Gas

Bristol has eleven natural gas MAHP's, operated by 3 pipeline operators, bordering with both South Gloucestershire Council and North Somerset Council. These pipelines cross the M32, M4, M48, M49 and M5 motorways, other main arterial routes, main rail and power line routes in the Bristol area. The pipelines move through densely populated areas, and also areas of historic importance.

The 3 natural gas pipeline operators within Bristol are:

- National Gas
  responsible for operating the National Transmission System (NTS).
- Wales & West Utilities Ltd (WWU)
  responsible for operating the Local Transmission System (LTS).
- Seabank Power Ltd
  responsible for operating the Seabank Power Station gas supply pipeline.

Details of the MAHP routes, details of surrounding areas (including any vulnerable groups / service locations identified using GIS analysis) can be found in Part 3: Pipeline Details and Appendix D: Pipeline Maps.

Other

Bristol has another pipeline, operated by Esso Petroleum Company Ltd, which is not classified as a MAHP. Due to the operating pressure of this line, and the products transferred, information has been included in Part 4: Other Pipelines.

1.1.6 Related Documents

- Avon & Somerset Local Resilience Forum (ASLRF) Major Incident Response Guide
- ASLRF Operation Link
- BCC Incident Response Plan
- BCC Humanitarian Assistance Plan
- Pipelines Safety Regulations (1996) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1996/825

1.2 Responsibilities of Pipeline Operators

It is the responsibility of all Pipeline Operators to ensure that their staff are briefed, exercised and trained, as necessary, on the emergency response procedure as described either in this plan or in their own MAHP response plan.

1.2.1 National Gas and Wales & West Utilities Ltd

There are 3 principal areas that have responsibilities for dealing with gas pipeline incidents:

- **National Gas Emergency Contact Centre (NGECC):** This is a single point of contact for all gas distribution networks.
  - Calls made to the gas emergency number **0800 111999** will be received by the NGECC. All gas emergency calls received on this number are allocated to the appropriate organisation covered by the caller's post code.
  - In Bristol, WWU will initially investigate all calls and only hand them over to National Gas if National Gas assets are involved.

- **National Control Centres:** The Gas National Control Centre (GNCC) is operated by the National Gas and operates the NTS, and the Wales & West Utilities Control Centre (WWUCC) operated by the WWU and controls the LTS.
    - Following a major incident the appropriate Network Control Centre would, where possible, take steps to mitigate the incident e.g. by remotely closing shut off valves.
    - The Control Centre would also be in communication with, and assist, the NGECC and National Gas or WWU operational personnel.
    - In the event of a major incident that could result in a Network gas supply emergency the nominated Network Emergency Co-ordinator would take control of the gas supply Network to ensure where possible that gas supplies to end users is maintained.

- **Front Line Response:**
    - **National Gas - Front line Response:** The managers within the local National Gas area in which the incident occurs are responsible for assessing the scale of the incident in conjunction with the relevant National Gas Control Centre. If appropriate, depending upon the scale of the incident, a National Gas Incident Management Team would be set up.

      An Incident Controller would be appointed, who would be responsible for co-ordinating the National Gas response to the incident including liaison with Emergency Services, the Council, and other key agencies (to ensure that adequate provision is made for vulnerable members of the community).

      Overall control of the incident by National Gas will be from an Incident Control Room at the appropriate National Gas office. The National Gas Incident Controller and the Incident Management Team will be based in the Incident Control Room.

      Where a major incident has occurred, an On-site Controller will be appointed, and a control point established, (e.g. National Gas incident vehicle), this would co-locate with, or be as close as possible to, the Emergency Services Forward Control Point (FCP). National Gas operational staff will normally manage the incident on site on behalf of National Gas.

    - **Wales & West Utilities Ltd - Front line Response:** WWU Managers within the local area in which the incident occurs are responsible for assessing the scale of the incident in conjunction with the relevant Control Centre. If appropriate, an Incident Management Team would be set up.

      An Incident Controller would be appointed, who would be responsible for co-ordinating the WWU response to the incident including liaison with Emergency Services, the Council, and other key agencies. The WWU Incident Controller and the WWU Incident Management Team would be based in an Incident Control Room at Celtic Springs, Newport.

      WWU operational staff will normally manage the incident on site. Where a major incident has occurred a local control point may be set up, which will be as close as possible to the Emergency Services FCP.

1.2.2 Seabank Power Ltd

The response from Seabank Power Ltd will be co-ordinated by an Incident Controller (usually the duty Shift Engineer) based in the Central Control Room at Seabank Power Station.

The Incident Controller (or designate) is responsible for:

- Receiving alerts of any pipeline leak or damage
- Assessing the scale and location of the incident
- Activating on-site emergency procedures to safeguard persons on site, if the breach is near Seabank Power Station (or the Abson Compressor Station)
- Notifying and liaising with the Emergency Services, the Council, and other key agencies and where possible neighbours to the incident scene
- Initiating mitigation measures such as shutting down gas turbines, isolating the pipeline and for activating the emergency response arrangements with WWU

If appropriate, the Emergency Control Panel (Seabank Management Team) will also be convened and will consider sending a technician to the scene and a liaison officer to the Emergency Services FCP.

WWU Response Procedure - Seabank Power Ltd have an ongoing arrangement with WWU, that WWU will manage a MAHP incident at the scene on behalf of Seabank Power Ltd. It should not be assumed that WWU will undertake notifications to relevant Emergency Services. This will be completed by Seabank Power Ltd.

Seabank Power will supply the following information to WWU:

- Current pipeline pressure
- Leak information, including:
    - Location description
    - Location grid reference & What3words
    - Distance from Hallen Power station and / or Abson Compressor Station
    - Approximate size
    - Rate of pipeline pressure decay
- Status and operating intention of the Hallen Power Station
- Status of operating intention of the Abson Compressor Station

WWU will:

- Attend the leak within 2 hours
- Dispatch a responsible person(s) to liaise with Seabank Power Ltd
- Provide all necessary response (possibly through a sub-contractor) to support Seabank Power Ltd including:
    - Expert assessment of the situation
    - Purging requirements
    - Provisions of temporary or permanent repair techniques
    - Provision of specialist equipment

1.3 Responsibilities of Responding Agencies

It is the responsibility of all responding agencies to ensure that their staff are briefed, exercised and trained, as necessary, on the emergency response procedures described

in either this plan, the Avon and Somerset Local Resilience Forum (ASLRF) Major Incident Response Guide (MIRG), or in their own MAHP response plans.

The MIRG contains details of the roles & responsibilities of all key responding agencies, (not the MAHP pipeline operators).

The following key responding agencies are included in the MIRG:

- Avon & Somerset Constabulary
- Avon Fire & Rescue Service (AFRS)
- Bristol City Council
- British Transport Police
- Environment Agency
- Met Office
- National Highways
- NHS England & Improvement
- South Western Ambulance Service Foundation Trust (SWAST)
- UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) (Previously Public Health England PHE)

Network Rail are not included in the MIRG:

1.3.1 Network Rail

Network Rail own, maintain, and operate the railway infrastructure. If notified of an incident, Network Rail will:

- Ensure that the users of the lines affected are informed of the incident, including Train Operating Companies and Freight Operating Companies
- Inform their National Operations Centre, other affected routes, and controlling signal boxes for the area
- Ensure the appropriate action is taken to secure the safety of all staff, passengers, freight and trains on the affected lines, as decided by the senior staff in liaison with other agencies attending
- Ensure that any affected trains are properly identified and cleaned in conjunction with advice and guidance provided by UKHSA / STAC and the SCG / RCG
- Follow advice from UKHSA / STAC and the SCG / RCG in terms of closing and re-opening lines

Part Two: Emergency Response

2.1 Activation & Notification

2.1.1 Initial Alert

The first notification of any incident involving a MAHP may be made by a member of the public to either the Emergency Services via 999 or the pipeline operator through the national gas emergency number 0800 111999. It is also likely that the pipeline operator will detect a leak or pipeline breach.

2.1.2 Activation & Notification

If the Emergency Services, or the pipeline operator, confirm that they are dealing with a major incident on a MAHP, this plan must be activated.

A MAHP Major Incident covers a fire, explosion or uncontrolled emission from a Major Accident Hazard Pipeline.

The pipeline operator must determine the exact location and severity of the incident including the amount of the gas (or fuel product) released. Consideration must also be given to whether the incident has the potential to affect the community either directly via a fire, explosion, damage to property or indirectly through the loss of gas / fuel supply.

Once the pipeline operator has declared a MAHP emergency, the pipeline operator will notify the Avon Fire & Rescue Service, A&S Police and SWAST through the standard 999 system using the M/ETHANE mnemonic (see 2.1.4 M/ETHANE Template) where possible.

In the event that the pipeline operator is calling from outside the Avon area, they should call direct into Avon Fire & Rescue Service Control.

If a MAHP emergency is declared, proactive consideration should be given towards the declaration of a ‘Major Incident’, this will activate the agreed multi-agency arrangements as stated in the ASLRF MIRG and response following the principles of the JESIP Joint Doctrine.

2.1.3 Key Information for Notification

The notification cascade should include the following details where possible as well as any other relevant information, and should be made using the M/ETHANE mnemonic:

- Pipeline Operator
- Pipeline content & operating pressure
- Location of incident using the pipeline name, pipeline section, Ordnance Survey Grid Reference and What3Words
- Extent of escape
- Extent of damage
- Wind direction and speed
- Safe route to scene
- Number of casualties / missing persons
- Identity and contact number of caller

2.1.4 M/ETHANE Template

This is …..……(pipeline operator name & address) **We have had an incident / Major Accident, I have a METHANE message for you….**			
M	Major Incident	Has a Major Incident been declared? **YES / NO** *(If no, then complete ETHANE message)*	Note: MAHP Regulations use the term Major Accident – if in doubt go Yes
E	Exact Location	What is the exact location or geographical area of incident?	**……..…..** **(site address / location of incident)** (Use What3Words)
T	Type of Incident	What kind of incident is it?	**We have had a incident involving a Major Accident Hazard Pipeline (fire / explosion / gas release / specify other)** **Activate the Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Plan**
H	Hazards	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	**The chemicals / substances involved ……..** (Information on any debris, smoke plume, unstable structures, etc.)
A	Access	What are the best routes for access and egress?	**The safest approach to the incident is from …….**
N	Number of Casualties	How many casualties are there and what condition are they in?	**There (are …. / may be / are not any known) casualties, (give description of injuries, if known)**
E	Emergency Services	Which and how many emergency responder assets / personnel are required or are already on-scene?	**Fire, Police, and Ambulance (state as required)**
Provide your name and contact number. **Include any other relevant information, if available.** **Be prepared to answer specific questions from the emergency services.**			

2.1.5 Notification Cascade

The notification cascade should follow the M/ETHANE format as well as any other relevant information. Responding agencies should also consider notifying any other organisation, agency, or individual that may be impacted by the incident or that may assist in the emergency response.

Contact details are contained in Appendix B: Contact Details



Figure 1 - Notification Cascade

2.1.6 Operation Link

Depending on the incident, the pipeline operator or Emergency Services should also notify any additional agencies that may be required to respond.

Operation Link (Op Link) is a conference call protocol that is used by responding agencies in the event of or, in anticipation of an emergency which may involve or affect one or more ASLRF responder agencies.

The protocol can be activated by calling the dedicated 24/7 Op Link number (see Appendix B: Contact Details) and requesting the Force Incident Manager.

Once Op Link has been requested the earliest meeting is recommended to be 30 minutes after notification to allow partner agencies time to cascade the message to duty officers and obtain briefings from their own control rooms, etc.

OP LINK does not replace the notification cascade and involved responders should still cascade the messages, until the Op Link conference call is held (and attendance of relevant organisations is confirmed).

Note: It is possible due to the speed of delivery of the Op Link system for an Op Link notification to be received by a responder before they receive the cascade message sent by another agency. Once an Op Link call has started the formal cascade to organisations on the call can stop once attendance of relevant organisations is confirmed.

2.1.7 Resilience Direct

Consideration should be given to the activation of a resilience direct response page which should be updated by all involved responders with sitreps and agency reports to support sharing information and briefing for all tactical and strategic leads.

2.3 Initial Actions & Responses

2.3.1 Overall Response

Upon notification of an incident, the pipeline operator will initiate their incident control procedures, and the Emergency Services will take appropriate immediate measures, assess the extent of the situation under the respective command of their Incident Commanders and respond in line with concurrent combined procedures. They will concentrate on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility.

2.3.2 Maximum Thermal Hazard Range

Before any control points or cordons are established it is important that the **Maximum Thermal Hazard Range** for the affected pipeline is taken into account. The range is determined by the pipeline diameter, operating pressure and magnitude of failure. See Section 3.1: Pipelines Summary.

The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range is the maximum distance away from the pipeline where it is calculated that individuals could come to harm as a result of a pipeline failure and the resulting thermal radiation if the resultant gas escape ignites. The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range assumes a full-bore pipeline failure (rupture).

An individual beyond the maximum thermal hazard range would be expected to escape without becoming a casualty, assuming that individuals are able to move away from any fire that may occur in order to reach a safe location.

2.3.2.1 A Safe Distance for Emergency Control Points / General Public

If Emergency Control Points are being set up it is suggested that the Emergency Control Points and the general public shall initially be located at the specified distance of the Outer Cordon contained in the Local Authority emergency plan. When Pipeline Operators personnel arrive on site they will be able to advise whether it is appropriate to reduce this distance.

2.3.3 Emergency Flying Restrictions

An aircraft flying over a large gas release could cause ignition, therefore a **No Fly Zone** should be put into operation immediately. Requests to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for flying restrictions support can be made by dialling 01293 983880 during office hours (Mon–Fri 0830–1630) - or 07798 571385 out of office hours

2.3.4 Pipeline Operator

2.3.4.1 National Gas

Following confirmation by a National Gas Competent Person that a MAHP major incident has occurred, the National Gas Control Centre should take the steps outlined Below

The National Gas response to emergencies would normally involve the following areas:

- Emergency Call Centre (ECC)

  A call to the gas emergency number 0800 111 999 (see Section 9) will be received by the ECC. They are responsible for taking action to deal with the incoming reports and arranging for a First Call Operative to be despatched to the location of the incident.

- National Gas Transmission System

  The National Gas National Transmission System is controlled remotely from the National Control Centre (NCC). Following a major incident the National Control Centre will take steps to mitigate the incident for example by closing remotely operable shut off valves where available.

- Onsite Control
  Where a serious incident has occurred a Operations (Bronze) Incident Controller who can be identified by their tabard bearing the legend 'National Gas, GAS, Incident Controller' will be appointed and an Incident Control Point established (e.g. National Gas incident control vehicle or community hall). Where possible this will be as close as possible to the Public Emergency Services Incident Control Room.

  The incident will normally be managed on site on behalf of National Gas by National Gas Operational Staff.

- Overall Control

  If appropriate, depending upon the scale of the incident, an Incident (Silver) Team would be set up. This team would be responsible for managing the emergency. An Incident Controller would be appointed. The Incident Controller

would be responsible for co-ordinating the National Gas response to the incident including liaison with Local Authorities and emergency services.

National Gas will undertake the role and responsibilities of a Category II responder and shall provide specific input regarding managing hazards arising from any gas assets involved in the incident. Overall control of the incident will be by the relevant Category I responder. In the event of a Multi-Agency response to an incident, National Gas will work in accordance with the Joint Emergency Services Operability Principles (JESIP).

A member of the National Gas Incident Management Team will be nominated as a single point of contact for the Emergency Services and the Council, and once nominated, further communications will be through this contact.

2National Gas will confirm with the Emergency Services when the pipeline has been made safe and in agreement with the Emergency Services and the Council, will prepare procedures for purge repairs and re-commission as appropriate. This could take some time (2-3 months) depending on the number of people affected and would involve visiting each local connection in order to re-commission the system. National Gas may seek additional support through the Government in the form of Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), in order to shorten the time required to complete the reconnection.

2.3.4.2 Wales & West Utilities

Following confirmation by a WWU Competent Person that a MAHP major incident has occurred, the appropriate Control Centre should take the steps outlined in Figure 3 to mitigate the incident.

A member of the Incident Management Team will be nominated as a single point of contact for the Emergency Services and the Council, and once nominated; further communications will be through this individual.



Figure 3 - Overview of WWU Emergency Response to MAHP Incidents

WWU will confirm with the Emergency Services when the pipeline has been made safe and in agreement with the Emergency Services and the Council, will prepare procedures for purge repairs and re-commission as appropriate. This could take some time (2-3 months) depending on the number of people affected and would involve visiting each local connection in order to re-commission the system. WWU may seek additional support through arrangements with neighbouring Networks or the Government in the form of Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), in order to shorten the time required to complete the reconnection.

2.3.4.3 Seabank Power Ltd

In the first instance, it is likely that a leak or pipeline breach will be detected through the T-3000 DCS system, followed by visual confirmation at the scene. The Central Control Room (CCR) Shift Engineer will be alerted and the emergency procedures activated as outlined in the flowchart in Figure 4.

Anyone reporting an incident on the Seabank MAHP, should contact Seabank Power Ltd on: **0117 938 7833**. The call will be forwarded to the CCR Shift Engineer who will give advice on precautions to take and will activate Seabank's emergency procedures.

Initially the CCR Shift Engineer, acting as the Incident Controller, will inform the Emergency Services, Pipeline Response Contractor (WWU), Seabank Senior Managers and Security.



Figure 4 - Seabank Power Ltd Gas Leak Emergency Response Procedure

2.3.5 Avon Fire & Rescue Service

The Fire & Rescue Service will, where possible, initiate the immediate rescue of casualties from the risk area and prevent further deterioration of the incident by tackling any **secondary** fires only.

It is important that ignited gas (flaring directly from the leak / rupture) is **not** extinguished unless specifically requested by the pipeline operator.

Fire & Rescue Service Control will:

- On receipt of the call, mobilise the pre-determined attendance to the incident or nominated RVP, as appropriate
- Inform Police and SWAST Controls
- Following the first informative message from the scene, inform Police and SWAST Controls by providing a M/ETHANE report
- Inform the Duty Group Commander
- Establish and maintain liaison with the pipeline operator
- Inform Bristol City Council's Operation Centre
- Alert Network Rail to restrict movement of trains, if required
- Inform the EA re: airborne and aquatic pollution, if required
- Inform the relevant electricity company if overhead power lines are affected.

Officer-in-Charge of First Appliance will:

- **For an unignited release:** hold off and liaise with pipeline operator (when available) to determine the Maximum Thermal Hazard Range for the pipeline affected. See Part 3.1: Pipeline Summary
- On arrival, decide if the incident scene is tenable or untenable and inform Control, providing a M/ETHANE report
- If the incident scene is untenable, withdraw and establish Command Support (at least twice Maximum Thermal Hazard Range for pipeline affected)
- Liaise with other Emergency Services and the pipeline operator representative as soon as possible
- Determine if all persons are accounted for
- Consult risk card for incidents involving pipelines and act accordingly
- Provide hand-over to Supervisory Officer, as appropriate.
- Obtain the latest weather system via a request for a FireMet from the Met Office

Fire Incident Commander will:

- Consult risk card for incidents involving pipelines and act accordingly
- Ensure preservation of the scene as far as is reasonably practicable for any subsequent inquiry into the cause and circumstances of the incident.

2.3.6 Avon & Somerset Constabulary

Once alerted the Police will consult with the pipeline operator and determine the location and nature of the incident. An officer may attend the pipeline operator Control Centre and / or control point, as appropriate and if requested.

Subsequent actions will depend on the extent of the incident and may include the following:

- Saving of life in conjunction with other Emergency Services
- Assisting in the warning and possible evacuation of the public
- support with the coordination of the emergency response (including liaison and provision of support to the Port of Bristol Police within the Bristol Port Company boundary), as part of the Command & Control process
- Protection and preservation of the scene including the setting of cordons, evacuation and implementing traffic plans
- Coordination of the media response
- Investigation of the incident where appropriate, and assisting other investigative agencies
- Collation and dissemination of casualty information
- Identification of any deceased on behalf of Her Majesty's Coroner
- Assisting with the restoration of normality.

2.3.7 South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust (SWAST)

Following notification and confirmation of a major incident, the SWAST Emergency Operations Centre will determine the location and nature of the incident and dispatch the appropriate number of vehicles and personnel to the scene. An Operational Commander should attend the pipeline operator Control Centre and / or control point, as appropriate and if requested.

Subsequent actions will depend on the nature of the incident and the number of casualties involved, but may include:

- Triage, Treat and Transport casualties to appropriate receiving hospitals and where required establish a Casualty Clearing Station

- Provide an Operational Commander to liaise with the other Emergency Services commanders on scene.
- Activating Hazard Area Response Teams (HART) where necessary
- Provide a NILO (National Interagency Liaison Officer) to the Operational Commander and / or the Tactical Commander
- Establish a Marshalling Area to hold vehicles prior to bringing them to the on-site RVP
- Seek confirmation from the Fire & Rescue Service as to the safe approach of the incident site and determine with the Police an appropriate route
- Establish communications internally and externally with NHS partners

2.3.8 Bristol City Council

The Council will respond in accordance with this plan supplemented by the Council's Incident Response Plan.

Following notification to the Bristol Operations Centre (BOC) via the 24-hour emergency number, the operator will:

- Inform the Duty Emergency Planning Officer (EPO)
- Commence an event log
- Continue to accept and deal with any further messages until advised otherwise by the duty EPO or nominated representative.

The Duty EPO will:

- Determine the level of the Council's response and notify the Duty Director
- Arrange for the call-out of Council staff in accordance with the Incident Response Plan
- Co-ordinate the response to specific requests from the Emergency Services
- Arrange for Liaison Officers to be deployed to joint Emergency Services control points as required
- Arrange for the notification of neighbouring local authorities and other agencies, as appropriate
- Arrange for the activation of the Incident Management Team if necessary.

2.4 Working with the Media

In order to manage the potential media presence on site and co-ordinate the information being given to the media, a joint media policy should be adopted, including a Media Liaison Point.

A&S Police Media Officers will coordinate the media response with close liaison with parter agencies for a multi-agency response to the media, which will involve close liaison between designated media personnel from the key responding agencies and agreement on the contents of joint press releases. If an SCG has been established, a Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC) will be formed with each key responding agency represented.

This will allow:

- An initial standard media message to be given out
- The identification of a specific site near the incident for media to be briefed
- A programme of briefings for the media to keep them informed
- An opportunity for media trained personnel from each organisation to speak to the media
- Photo opportunities for the media, if safe to do so.

The pipeline operator's Media / Press Officer should also be included in the arrangements to ensure a consistent message is given. Media contacts for each pipeline operator can be found in Appendix B: Contact Details.
The media will have a significant role in keeping the public informed and any further warnings or information will be advised through these joint arrangements.

2.5 Warning & Informing

In the event of a major incident on a MAHP, there will inevitably be severe disruption to the lives of many members of the local community. Not only to those who live and work within the immediate area of the pipeline, but to residential and business properties served by the pipeline some significant distances away.

It is impossible to estimate the extent of the disruption due to the variety of factors that will influence an incident and its effects. It is vital that prompt and appropriate warning is given, as well as keeping those affected informed during the course of an incident.

The public will initially be informed by a standard warning message issued by the Police to the media. See Appendix C: Draft Media Statement.

Any or all of the following may be used to warn the public in the area:

- Social Media including the Council's Twitter and Facebook channels
- Local radio stations, e.g. BBC Radio Bristol
- Local television - BBC & ITV
- Hand-held PA systems / visits from available personnel in the immediate vicinity, if safe to do so.

Telephone help lines may also be used. If they are established, numbers will be released through the media.

Depending on the nature of the incident, the information may include:

- Advice on health protection
- Recommendations to stay indoors, or to evacuate.

Consideration should also be given to providing a focal point within the community where information and assistance can be obtained.

2.6 Public Health

2.6.1 Public Health

Consideration of the many public health implications created as a consequence of the pipeline failure will also need to be considered:

- Possible sewage contamination from disruption to sewerage infrastructure
- Disruption to water supplies
- Environmental contamination
- Damage to buildings releasing contamination such as asbestos, etc.

In the event that an SCG is established the provision of scientific and technical advice regarding the environment and public health to the SCG is outlined in national guidance available here.

The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) Regional Deputy Director or Duty/On-Call Consultant in Health Protection will advise on and/or agree the need for a Science and

Technical Advice Cell (STAC). UKHSA will activate and coordinate the provisions of the STAC in line with the STAC plan for LRFs in the South West.

Public health advice from various agencies involved in the response will be coordinated through joint arrangements such as the STAC (if convened).

2.6.2 Shelter or Evacuation

Initially the public will be advised to remain inside, as this will offer some protection from the heat and explosion hazards. However, as a last resort, it may be necessary to evacuate an area where there is a risk to life from the spread of fire, explosion, environmental or structural hazards, etc. The decision to evacuate will be taken by the relevant multi-agency co-ordinating group following advice from the UKHSA, STAC (if convened), and the pipeline operator.
The Police can only recommend evacuation and have no power to force people to leave their homes.

2.6.2.1 Evacuation

If the decision to evacuate is taken, the Police Incident Commander will appoint an Evacuation Officer to co-ordinate with partner agencies the evacuation and establish a suitable Evacuation Assembly Point (EAP).

Bristol City Council, with the support of other agencies, will endeavour to identify the vulnerable people in the community and will arrange for transport, if required, to a temporary reception / rest centre, taking into account any specialist needs of those affected.

The affected population will be advised to go to Reception Centre(s). The Centre(s) will be set up and staffed by Council personnel, assisted by the voluntary agencies, and will provide welfare support, refreshments and, if necessary, short-term accommodation.

The decision on which venue to use will be made by the relevant Local Authority at the time of need depending on wind direction, the number of displaced individuals, and availability of venue.

2.7 Recovery[1]

Response and recovery are not discrete activities that occur sequentially. Recovery aspects will need to be considered during the response phase of an incident, as actions taken (or not taken) at that time will have an impact on the eventual consequences. At some point, however, the emergency response phase will come to an end and the main focus of activities will move to those of recovery and clean-up.

Recovery is defined as:

> **The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.[2]**

2.7.1 Control & Coordination

The Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), will at its first meeting, initiate a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) to consider the evolving consequence management issues of recovery for the affected area. The Chair of the RCG will sit on the SCG to ensure

[1] This part of the plan outlines the Recovery Arrangements that are detailed in the Bristol City Council's Recovery Plan. This document is available upon request from the Civil Protection Unit, Bristol City Council.
[2] "Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance" HM Government Cabinet Office

fluidity between groups and will eventually assume responsibility on handover from the SCG.

The affected Local Authority will lead the RCG by means of providing the RCG Chair and Secretariat. Other affected Local Authorities should be represented at the RCG and have a constant overview of the emerging strategic issues. Many other organisations may also be involved in the recovery, which may continue for many weeks/months.

The RCG will need to establish various sub groups for leading on the different aspects of recovery depending on the nature of the incident.

An important part of the work of the RCG, in the response phase of the incident, is to develop a recovery strategy and inform the SCG of this. This will ensure decisions made by the SCG do not compromise medium to long-term recovery.

2.7.2 Handover – Response to Recovery

To ensure that all agencies are aware of the arrangements for handover from response to recovery, it is suggested a formal meeting is held in the early stages of the emergency. Membership at this meeting should, as a minimum, include the SCG Chair and the affected local authorities, and should consider:

- The criteria to be used to assess when the handover can take place from the SCG to the RCG.
- The process for the handover. It is recommended that a formal handover process be followed.
- Communications to other responding agencies and to the wider community, including the political arena, about the handover. This must include what the role of this RCG is.

2.7.3 Location of RCG

In the early part of the recovery phase, it is important that agencies involved are co-located away from their normal office environment to avoid temptation to return to the day job. If the Police are unable to host a RCG at the SCC then an alternative location should be found, e.g. Bristol City Council's Incident Management Suite in Temple. It is essential that agencies that were not involved in the response phase but are central to the recovery be integrated into the RCG working environment.

2.7.4 Role of Elected Members

The Elected Members of the affected community have an important role to play in assisting with the recovery process. As community representatives, they will be able to gather and make known the concerns of their community and feed them into the recovery process through the Community Engagement Team[3]. They also have a very important role in disseminating credible information and advice.

Note: The normal political processes and structures will still apply in the recovery phase. Some Members may become involved in aspects of the Recovery Group alongside their normal committees.

[3] The Community Engagement Team is a group drawn from the wider community to reflect community concerns, feelings and initiatives and assist in informing the wider community. They can also assist in the impact assessment of the affected community.

Part Three: Pipeline Details

3.1 Pipelines Summary

HSE Ref	Pipeline Identification - National Grid Ref	Start Grid	End Grid	Diameter (mm)	MOP (barg)	MTHR (m)	Min Outer Cordon (m)
1499	14 Feeder Pucklechurch / Seabank (National Gas NTS Line)	ST 712757	ST 538825	457.2	70	187	454
1468	Seabank National / Seabank Regional (AS)	ST 536823	ST 538825	457.2	32.6	90	180
1484	Seabank / Frampton Cottrell (SF)	ST 538825	ST 645831	609.6	32.6	130	260
1485	Seabank / Hallen (SH)	ST 538825	ST 555805	323.8	13.8	50	100
1486	Seabank / Kingsweston Lane (SK)	ST 538825	ST 520798	219.1	14.5	50	100
1494	Hallen / Nailsea (HN)	ST 555805	ST 456700	273	32.6	70	140
1479	Hallen / Nailsea (duplicate) (HD)	ST 555805	ST 456700	323.8	32.6	70	140
1480	Hallen / Shirehampton (HS)	ST 555805	ST 546772	273	13.8	50	100
1474	Frampton Cottrell / Stapleton (FS)	ST 645831	ST 604748	323.8	32.6	70	140
1483	Queen Charlton / East Dundry (QE)	ST 640665	ST 585669	219.1	35.9	70	140
	Seabank	ST 712757	ST 536825	1050	75	711	1422

MOP: Maximum Operating Pressure.
MTHR: The **Maximum Thermal Hazard Range** is determined by the pipeline diameter, operating pressure and magnitude of failure. The range is based on the effects of thermal radiation for the worst-case scenario of an ignited full bore rupture, and is the maximum distance from the pipeline within which the surrounding population could suffer a specified level of harm in the event of a release of gas following a pipeline failure.

Any inner cordon should initially be located at the **Maximum Thermal Hazard Range**.

The following pipeline has been abandoned by Wales & West Utilities due to the closure of the Sevalco site.

1488	*Seabank / Sevalco (SS)*	*ST 538825*	*ST 535817*	*168.3*	*14.5*	*25*	

3.2 National Gas Pipeline Details

Title of Pipeline: **Pucklechurch / Seabank (No 14 Feeder)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1499** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 1

	Start	End
Name	Pucklechurch	Seabank
Grid Ref.	ST 712757	ST 538825
Description	This pipeline runs north from the east of Bristol at Pucklechurch, under the M4 and running west of Yate. It then continues around the north of Bristol, passing under the M4 and M5 again before heading southwest to Seabank, north of Avonmouth.	

No vulnerable groups / service locations identified within the MTHR of this pipeline.

3.3 Wales & West Utilities Pipeline Details

Title of Pipeline: **Seabank National / Seabank Regional (AS)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1468** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 2

	Start	End
Name	Seabank National	Seabank Regional
Grid Ref.	ST 536823	ST 537825
Description	This pipeline runs along the south eastern side of the Seabank site.	

No vulnerable groups / service locations identified within the MTHR of this pipeline.

Title of Pipeline: **Seabank / Frampton Cotterell (SF)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1484** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 3

	Start	End
Name	Seabank (24,84)	Frampton Cottrell (21)
Grid Ref.	ST 538825	ST 645831
Description	This pipeline runs east around the north of Bristol from Seabank (north of Avonmouth), following the M5 from just south of Junction 17 to the M4/M5 interchange, then onto Gloucester Road Farm north west of Bradley Stoke.	

No vulnerable groups / service locations identified within the MTHR of this pipeline.

Title of Pipeline: **Seabank / Hallen (SH)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1485** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 4

	Start	End
Name	Seabank (24,85)	Hallen (26)
Grid Ref.	ST 538825	ST 555805
Description	This pipeline runs southeast from Seabank to Hallen and takes a route just north of the South Gloucestershire / Bristol City border.	

No vulnerable groups / service locations identified within the MTHR of this pipeline.

Title of Pipeline: **Seabank / Kings Weston Lane (SK)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1486** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 5

	Start	End
Name	Seabank	Kings Weston Lane
Grid Ref.	ST 538825	ST 520798
Description	This pipeline runs south from Seabank parallel with the railway, and along St Andrews Road to Kings Weston Lane.	
Vulnerable groups / service locations identified with the MTHR of this pipeline:		
Type: COMAH Site	Esso Petroleum Company Ltd Avonmouth Terminal St Andrews Road, Holesmouth, Avonmouth, Bristol, BS11 9BN	Grid Ref: ST 522810

Title of Pipeline: **Hallen / Nailsea - Original (HN)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1494** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 6

	Start	End
Name	Hallen (26)	Nailsea (31)
Grid Ref.	ST 555805	ST 456700
Description	Two separate pipelines (HSE Pipeline Index 1494 & 1479) running south from Hallen under the M5 near the railway, south between the M5 and Lawrence Weston, under the River Avon towards Easton-in-Gordano and Portbury and across rural areas to the north western fringe of Nailsea.	
Vulnerable groups / service locations identified with the MTHR of this pipeline:		
Type: School	Avon Primary School Barracks Lane, Shirehampton, Bristol BS11 9NG	Grid Ref: ST 527776
Type: 50 Plus Housing	Antona Court & Drive Antona Drive, Shirehampton, Bristol BS11 9RL	Grid Ref: ST 525774
Type: Nursing Home	Kingsmead Lodge Care Home West Town Road, Bristol, BS11 9NJ	Grid Ref: ST 524772

Title of Pipeline: **Hallen / Nailsea - Duplicate (HD)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1479** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 7

	Start	End
Name	Hallen (26)	Nailsea (31)
Grid Ref.	ST 555805	ST 456700
Description	See HSE Pipeline Index 1494.	
Vulnerable groups / service locations identified with the MTHR of this pipeline:		
Type: School	Avon Primary School Barracks Lane, Shirehampton, Bristol BS11 9NG	Grid Ref: ST 527776
Type: Nursing Home	Kingsmead Lodge Care Home West Town Road, Bristol, BS11 9NJ	Grid Ref: ST 524772

Title of Pipeline: **Hallen / Shirehampton (HS)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1480** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 8

	Start	End
Name	Hallen	Shirehampton
Grid Ref.	ST 555805	ST 546772
Description	This pipeline runs south east from Hallen, past Blaise Hamlet along Kings Weston Road, and through Blaise Castle Estate towards the iron bridge and Westbury Lane, (near junction of B4057 and B4054).	

Vulnerable groups / service locations identified with the MTHR of this pipeline:

Type: COMAH Site	Hallen PSD (South Site) Ison Hill, Hallen, South Gloucestershire BS10 7SG	Grid Ref: ST 563803

Title of Pipeline: **Frampton Cotterell / Stapleton (FS)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1474** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 9

	Start	End
Name	Frampton Cotterell (21)	Stapleton (28)
Grid Ref.	ST 645831	ST 604748
Description	This pipeline runs south from Frampton across the M4, then west of the M32, south past Lockleaze and the Eastgate shopping centre until it meets the railway near Glenfrome Road/Eastgate Road.	

Vulnerable groups / service locations identified with the MTHR of this pipeline:

Type: COMAH Site	Wales & West Utilities Ltd Glenfrome House Holder Station Eastgate Road, Eastville, Bristol, BS5 5NP	Grid Ref: ST 605748

Title of Pipeline: **Queen Charlton / East Dundry (QE)**
HSE Pipeline Index: **1483** Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 10

	Start	End
Name	Queen Charlton	East Dundry
Grid Ref.	ST 640665	ST 585669
Description	This pipeline runs east from Queens Charlton, (west of Whitchurch) to East Dundry	

No vulnerable groups / service locations identified within the MTHR of this pipeline.

3.4 Seabank Pipeline Details & RVP's

Title of Pipeline: **Seabank Power Ltd**
HSE Pipeline Index: Pipeline Map: Appendix D - Map 11

	Start	End
Name	Abson	Seabank
Grid Ref.	ST 712757	ST 536825
What3Words	usage.empire.doing	bulky.easygoing.move
Description	This pipeline runs north from the east of Bristol at Pucklechurch, under the M4 and running west of Yate. It then continues around the north of Bristol, under the M5 and M4 again before heading southwest to Avonmouth. It connects the Abson Compressor Station to Seabank Power Station, covering 27km.	

No vulnerable groups / service locations identified within the MTHR of this pipeline.

Seabank Power MAHP Rendezvous Points			
RVP	**Grid Ref.**	**What3Words**	**Description**
14	ST 567830	headrest.gurgling.title	Entrance to Washingpool Farm off the B4055, Easter Compton.
15	ST 572821	exit.fade.string	Entrance to All Saints' Church, Farm Lane, Easter Compton.
16	ST 544810	young.diner.truth	Entrance to British Gas LNG plant, Hallen. Access to pipeline is from the lane leading to Crook's Marsh off the C-class road between Hallen and the A403.
17	ST 535817	comedians.motored.slippery	'Old Sevalco site' car park on the A403.
18	ST 534826	sprint.mouths.hiding	Security gatehouse at Seabank Power Station.

Part Four: Other Pipelines

4.1 ESSO

4.1.1 Pipeline Details

The Esso Avonmouth line is a 6" diameter pipeline running from Fawley in Hampshire to Avonmouth, a distance of 134 km (83 miles). The pipeline contains various grades of gasoline and diesel with an operating pressure of up to 1440 psig (99 barg).

This pipeline is not classified as a Major Accident Hazard Pipeline according to the Pipeline Safety Regulations.

Due to the operating pressure of this line and the products transferred information has been included in this plan.

Esso Petroleum Company Ltd have a Pipelines Emergency Response Plan which covers this and other pipelines in detail.

Pipeline route, see Appendix D - Map 12

4.1.2 Actions & Responses by Esso

All Esso pipeline operations are remotely controlled from Esso's Pipeline Control Centre (PCC) based in West London, the initial response will be co-ordinated from the PCC until local control of the incident has been set up.

Initial contact from the Emergency Services can be made with the PCC, using the number shown Appendix B - Contact Details.

4.1.3 Off Site

Staff located at the PCC will initiate Esso's response to a reported incident / emergency on the pipeline and monitor.

This will include:

- Arranging for the depressurisation and shutdown of the pipeline affected
- Initiating the closure of relevant cross-country valves
- Notifying the Fire and Rescue Service, Police and Environment Agency
- Calling in Esso personnel and relevant contractors
- Advising senior management, environmental specialists and HSE (as appropriate)
- Establishing communications with Esso's Site Main Controller.

4.1.4 On Site

Esso will dispatch personnel to the scene of the incident to liaise with the Emergency Services and assist with the provision of specialist incident management advice and equipment. Initially this will be a Site Incident Controller (SIC) who will co-ordinate the pipeline response at the scene of the incident, until relieved by the Site Main Controller (SMC).

The SIC will have local knowledge of the area including geography of the pipeline, location of valves, watercourses and river crossings and provide technical advice to the SMC.

The response will include:

- Investigating and assessing the extent of the incident
- Calling in assistance from local expert pipeline personnel
- Identifying any additional resources required
- Initiating containment
- In liaison with other key agencies, co-ordinating the clean-up, repair and re-instatement.

Appendix A: Hazards & Effects

A.1 Pipeline Breach

Significant damage to a MAHP that results in a pipeline rupture or puncture will lead to a sudden and rapid release of pressurised gas. The worst-case event would occur as a result of a full-bore rupture, which subsequently ignites. Pipelines running through rural areas are at greatest risk of a rupture whereas in suburban areas, due to design and operating conditions, pipelines are unlikely to fail by rupture or corrosion but will leak if punctured.

Thermal Radiation (heat): If the gas ignites, the most significant consequence will be from thermal radiation (heat) and may involve little opportunity for escape. Depending on the magnitude of the release, thermal radiation levels may be sufficient to cause injuries to individuals out of doors in the vicinity of the release. People indoors will be shielded from these effects, but radiation levels may be sufficiently intense to cause buildings to catch fire.

If a release of gas is ignited immediately it may burn as a jet flame or pool fire. If a developed flammable gas cloud is ignited, it may burn as a flash fire back to the point of failure.

The duration of the pipeline fire will vary depending on a number of factors such as the size of the pipeline failure, gas pressure, pipeline diameter and distance from the point of failure to the nearest isolation valves. The release could potentially continue for some time, and in some cases, it may be a number of hours before the gas is isolated the pipeline depressurised and the hazard removed. However the rate of gas release and the consequences of an ignited gas release will reduce with time as the pipeline depressurises.

Debris: The initial force of the gas escaping will result in a significant pressure-blast; cover materials such as soils, hard-core etc will be thrown at high velocity into the air, forming a crater around the pipeline. The Secondary blast effects will also be considerable, such as damage to window glass, etc.

Noise: The sudden release of gas under high pressure will generate significant high noise levels. The noise levels will be difficult to predict prior to the event, as they will be dependent on the nature of the release. High noise levels can be very disorientating. Large numbers of people may seek medical attention for hearing problems, some short-lived but others may have suffered permanent damage.

Explosion: An explosion would not normally be expected to occur as a result of a pipeline failure. An explosion following a release of natural gas can only occur if the released gas is confined in some way and present in flammable concentrations. This could occur for instance if the released gas entered a building. However, it is considered to be unlikely that a failure of a MAHP would lead to a gas entering buildings in flammable concentrations.

If a release occurs that does not initially ignite then emergency responders should recognise that ignition of the gas could potentially occur at any time. Steps should be taken to ensure that potential ignition sources are not introduced into the area around the release where gas could potentially be present in flammable concentrations.

If the release is not ignited, it will form a cloud that may disperse over large distances. As it disperses it will be diluted with air and the concentration will eventually fall below the lower flammability limit. The extent of the flammable gas cloud is difficult to predict, as it is dependent on the release pressure, size and orientation of the release and the atmospheric conditions. Gas is lighter than air and the majority of failures will result in a gas cloud that will rise above ground level.

Data on a probable dispersion footprint can be obtained through the pipeline operator or the Fire & Rescue Service via a CHEMET report request. The pipeline operator will also deploy an engineer to the source of the leak with equipment that will detect if and where gas is present in flammable concentrations.

Prior to entering the WWU system all MAHP in the Bristol area are odorised to give the characteristic smell of Gas. However, pipelines operated by National Gas are not odorised.

It should not be assumed that if gas cannot be smelt that individuals are at a safe distance.

Vulnerable Locations: Where pipelines cross potentially vulnerable locations such as road or rail crossings, or other pipelines or services, additional design and operational precautions are taken where appropriate to reduce the likelihood of pipeline failure. The pipeline operator will advise if any special considerations are needed at these points.

Above ground sections on the Seabank Power Ltd pipeline are within the boundary fence of Abson Compressor Station and Seabank Power Station only. For WWU and National Gas pipelines, the majority of above ground pipeline sections are within the boundary fence of sites or within fenced compounds. There may however, be some short sections of above ground pipeline, for example river crossings, that are not within fenced compounds. These locations are subject to increased monitoring and surveillance.

A.2 Hazards of Natural Gas

Natural gas is colourless and odourless in its pure form. It is combustible, and when burned it gives off a great deal of energy (heat). It is lighter than air, and can form explosive mixtures in air in the concentration range 5 to 15%. Under normal conditions it is stable, but becomes a very dangerous fire and explosive hazard (if in confined areas) when exposed to a source of ignition in the presence of oxygen.

The potential hazards from natural gas are associated with flame contact, thermal radiation causing burns to human tissue, and explosion overpressure. The immediate potential danger to the environment is from the effects of fire and explosion in the vicinity of the incident.

Asphyxiation: Natural gas is not toxic, but in high concentrations, it is an asphyxiant due to the exclusion of oxygen. Inhalation may cause headache, drowsiness, severe breathing difficulties, and can lead to unconsciousness; affected persons are at risk of death if not removed from this environment. However, these conditions may only exist in close proximity to the point of pipeline failure.

Appendix B: Contact Details

Please note that this table contains some Control Room and ex-directory telephone numbers. It must only be made available for the purpose of enabling the appropriate response to be made during a major accident.

Organisation	Emergency	Other Telephone
Avon & Somerset Constabulary	999	101
Avon & Somerset Constabulary (Force Incident Manager) (**Operation Link**)	01278 645935	
Avon Fire & Rescue Service (Control)	999	0117 926 2061 Ext 312
Bath & NE Somerset Council	01225 477477	01225 477000
Bristol Airport	01275 473400	
Bristol City Council (Operations Centre)	0117 922 2050	0117 357 6689 (EPRT Emergency line, only to be used for major incidents)
Bristol Port Police	01275 375787	0117 982 0000
British Transport Police (BTP)	0121 254 8904	0800 405040
Civil Aviation Authority	via Bristol Airport	
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)	0303 444 2718	
Environment Agency	0845 850 3518	0800 807 060
Esso Petroleum Company, Limited (Central Operations Group)	0238 089 1541	Alternative Pipeline Control Centre: 01784 422493
First Bus	0117 922 3844	Via Bristol City Council (Operations Centre)
Gas Emergency Number [4]	0800 111999	
HSE	0151 922 9235	0300 003 1747 (Customer Service Team)
Met Office – EMARC Emergency Support (CHEMET, etc.)	01392 447947	0330 135 4271
National Highways	0117 316 5723	0300 123 5000
Network Rail (Swindon Rail Control)	01793 533524 (Duty Control Manager)	01793 533592
NHS England & Improvement	0303 033 8833	
North Somerset Council	01934 634 700 (in hrs)	01934 888 888 (out of hours)
Seabank Power Ltd	0117 938 7833 (Main Control Room)	0117 982 0020

[4] This number is also used for reporting domestic gas escapes. Council or Emergency Service Staff calling this number during a major pipeline incident should make it clear that they are a member of the emergency response team dealing with a potential high pressure pipeline emergency and ask to talk to a National Gas Emergency Contact Centre (NGECC) Duty Manager.

Organisation	Emergency	Other Telephone
South Gloucestershire Council	01454 868009	0117 922 2050
South Western Ambulance Service Foundation Trust (SWAST)	999	01454 455400
UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) South West Region Health Protection Team	0300 303 8162	0300 303 8162
UKHSA Radiation, Chemical, Climate and Environmental (RCCE) advice line	0300 303 3049 (Chemical and Environmental Hazards Duty Desk **in hours**)	0344 892 0555 **(Out of hours)**
Wales & West Utilities Ltd Media Enquiries	0800 111 999 (24hr)	0292 027 8860 or 07966 901518

Appendix C: Draft Media Statement

An incident has occurred at …….. involving a leak* / fire from a pipeline at / near (location plus map reference).

The emergency services and other relevant agencies are responding.

The Public are instructed to:

STAY AWAY FROM THE IMMEDIATE AREA

* *If the incident involves an un-ignited leak:*

IF YOU ARE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY TO THIS LOCATION YOU MUST:

- Stop smoking and put out any naked flames
- Do not start any vehicle engines or stop any that are running
- Do not use radio equipment
- Do not use mobile phones or radio pagers
- Do not use cameras, flash bulbs or electronic flashes
- Do not use torches
- Do not use tools which might generate sparks

A further message will be released when the incident is under control.

Listen to the local media for updates.

Appendix D: Pipeline Maps

The following maps are distributed with this plan.

Map No.	HSE Ref	Pipeline Identification	Operator
1	1499	14 Feeder Pucklechurch / Seabank	National Gas
2	1468	Seabank National / Seabank Regional (AS)	Wales & West Utilities Ltd
3	1484	Seabank / Frampton Cottrell (SF)	
4	1485	Seabank / Hallen (SH)	
5	1486	Seabank / Kingsweston Lane (SK)	
6	1494	Hallen / Nailsea (HN)	
7	1479	Hallen / Nailsea (duplicate) (HD)	
8	1480	Hallen / Shirehampton (HS)	
9	1474	Frampton Cottrell / Stapleton (FS)	
10	1483	Queen Charlton / East Dundry (QE)	
11		Seabank	Seabank Power Ltd
12		Esso Pipeline	Esso