



Avon and Somerset Police

Airport Ground Response Plan to a Hijacked Aircraft

Version 2.0

Avon and Somerset Police Tactical/Operational (combined) ERP 08

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AMENDMENTS

DATE	NAME	DETAILS
03/11/2023	Rob Browne 3462	Checked by Chris Gresswell and Jon Stell so sent to Ben Moseley who ratified it.
Jan 2025	Sgt Rachel Hodges	Additional RVPs removed. Glossary removed and acronyms incorporated throughout main body text of ERP, New First Officer at scene Action Card added Version 2.0 created and published in Pocketbook and Resilience Direct

Storage of Plan

- 1 Electronic copy locations: PocketBook, Resilience Direct and Contingency Planning SharePoint
- 2 Paper copy locations: 1 copy in Contingency Planning secure cabinet and 2 copies in Force Incident Managers secure cabinets at Command Room at HQ and Bridgwater

Plan Approval

This Order is authorised on behalf of the Chief Constable by:

Directorate Lead:	C.Supt Ben Moseley (Owner)
Signature:	
Date:	Nov /2023
I have reviewed this document and I am satisfied that it provides a reasonable assurance that this Directorate will be able to continue to provide the necessary minimum level of service.	
Subject Matter Advisor: (Author)	Ins Chris Gresswell and CTBP Ins Jon Stell
Signature:	
Date:	Nov 2023
Plan to be reviewed ¹ in line with the Avon and Somerset Police review schedule ² of no more than 3 years from publication date; or following significant departmental change or post live incident whichever is the soonest.	
Date of next review:	Jan 2027
Continuity Team (Custodian)	

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¹ Cabinet Office Chapter 4 Risk Assessment Duty Page 6 paragraph 4.8 states risk should be updated “from time to time” CCA 2004 S.2(1)

(a) – (b) Duty to assess, plan and advise

² Review per set yearly, 2 yearly or 3 yearly intervals based on individual plans

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1. Information.

1.1. The national contingency planning guidance, Ground Response Plan for the Receipt of Hijacked Aircraft, has been commissioned by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) lead for Aviation Security and Airport Policing, and developed to assist police forces in the creation of localised Ground Response Plans (GRPs) for the receipt of hijacked aircraft.:

1.2. This document is a localised Avon and Somerset Police (ASP) plan of the National Contingency Planning Guidance for UK Police Forces on creation of a Ground Response Plan for the Receipt of Hijacked Aircraft Version 2.0, dated 11th September 2023.

1.3. Definition - Hijack of an aircraft in flight

The legal definition of the hijack of an aircraft in flight, contained in section 1 of the Aviation Security Act of 1982 is:

(1) A person on board an aircraft in flight who unlawfully, by the use of force or by threats of any kind, seizes the aircraft or exercises control of it commits the offence of hijacking, whatever his nationality, whatever the State in which the aircraft is registered and whether the aircraft is in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, but subject to subsection (2) below.

(2) If –

- a) the aircraft is used in military, customs, or police service, or
- b) both the place of take-off and the place of landing are in the territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered,

Subsection (1) above shall not apply unless—

- (i) the person seizing or exercising control of the aircraft is a United Kingdom national; or
- (ii) his act is committed in the United Kingdom; or
- (iii) the aircraft is registered in the United Kingdom or is used in the military or customs service of the United Kingdom or in the service of any police force in the United Kingdom

2. Intent

2.1. The overarching aim of this document, when responding to a hijacked aircraft, is the preservation of life.

2.2. In order to achieve this aim, the GRP should consider:

- Containing the stronghold; establishing control and creating the opportunity to develop the response.

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- Communicating with the stronghold; establishing the intent and capability of suspects and negotiate a safe resolution.
- Developing a capability to intervene should that become necessary.
- Controlling any mass exit whether a) exodus or b) controlled evacuation, in order to preserve life and arrest any offenders.

3. Method

- 3.1. The response to a hijacked aircraft, once on the ground, will always be police led and is likely to be initially managed within a police Force Control Room or other dedicated police control/operations room.
- 3.2. Activation of a GRP is likely to be declared by the Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) located in the relevant police Force Control Room or dedicated airport police control room. In most circumstances, during the early phase of the response, this TFC will be an initial TFC (iTFC).
- 3.3. Activation should trigger a multi-agency response designed to rapidly inform, mobilise, and operationally deploy the most appropriate resources in order to receive a hijacked aircraft to identify, contain, negotiate and neutralise the threat and therefore save life. In order to support an effective response, it is important that relevant partner agencies and specialist national assets are informed as a priority.
- 3.4. It may be unclear during the early stages of an airborne security event as to the exact nature of the threat. Where an aircraft is in-bound, it may not be until the aircraft has been received at the airport that a clearer threat picture can be established. The TFC may determine the activation of a GRP is appropriate in the early stages of an airborne security event whilst a clearer threat picture is developed.
- 3.5. RVPs should be identified to expedite the response and to allow any briefings to take place prior to responders moving forward towards the incident. These briefings may involve some safety elements for those non-airport responders required to enter the airside area.
- 3.6. When entering an airport, secure control points must be maintained to ensure the safety and integrity of the airport.
- 3.7. Full airside manoeuvring is strictly controlled under authority of the airport operator. When responders enter airside areas, arrangements should be made for authorised personnel to escort those responders during the duration of the incident.
- 3.8. The response to a hijacked aircraft will require a robust and resilient police command structure. The TFC should begin the process of building this structure by informing and briefing (1) a cadre TFC to perform the role of a

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siege ground commander (SGC) and (2) an Outer Scene Commander (OSC) as soon as practicable. They should also seek a further cadre TFC to replace them in the role of control room/operations room based TFC (or siege tactical commander (STC)).

- 3.9. The TFC should contact an SFC as soon as practicable, as part of the process of building an effective command structure. The SFC is responsible for reviewing and ensuring the resilience and effectiveness of the command structure. The SFC also has the crucial role of making the formal request for any military assistance through the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) process and should be contacted as early as possible. TFCs, SFCs and chief officers should be aware of the document 'MACA Guidance to Practitioners', which is available from the Homeland Security Group (HSG) Operational Policy Team.
- 3.10. In circumstances where it is deemed necessary for a police officer, who is not trained in negotiation, to communicate with the pilot, crew or hostage takers, the negotiator liaison officer initial actions guidance should be used (see Appendix C). Negotiator coordinator advice should be obtained when considering this course of action.
- 3.11. A hijacked aircraft MACA is likely to be authorised by way of a rapid authorisation call (RAC) convened by the HSG Operational Policy team.
- 3.12. The CTSFO network provide the highest level of dynamic search trained officers within UK armed policing. This includes the capability to conduct the dynamic search of an aircraft.
- 3.13. CTSFO teams provide a national capability and are based strategically across the UK within the following forces/collaborations: West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, West Midlands, South East Region, southern Wales Joint Firearms Unit, South West collaboration, Metropolitan Police Service and Police Scotland. The Police Service of Northern Ireland also maintain a CTSFO capability, however they operate independently of the national network.
- 3.14. CTSFO assets can provide a combined response emergency action (EA) option alongside initially deployed military assets. Specialist military units are able to provide a specialist method of entry (MOE) capability to breach into aircraft and ensure access is gained for the CTSFO teams.
- 3.15. The Avon and Somerset Police command structure will remain until the CT Commander is in a position to assume command for the resolution of the terrorist incident. The transfer of command should be agreed between the relevant commanders and documented as per College of Policing APP-Armed Policing.

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4. Administration

4.1. Mass exit from an aircraft.

4.1.1. The generic term 'mass exit' is used to describe both an exodus and controlled evacuation.

4.1.2. An 'exodus' from an aircraft would be unprompted by direct police (or military) action or activity. An exodus could occur at any point during the incident.

4.1.3. A 'controlled evacuation' from an aircraft would involve the release of a large number of passengers from the aircraft, under police direction/control following negotiation or police/military intervention into the aircraft. A controlled evacuation can only take place where the police have planned and are prepared for such a release.

4.2. Preparation for a mass exit

4.2.1. The release of hostages from an aircraft will be managed by the TFC (likely the SGC). The TFC should liaise with the SIO, Forensic Management Teams and CT negotiator to determine the best way of co-ordinating the evacuation whilst preserving evidence, maximising the safety of the evacuees and minimising the risk to responders.

4.2.2. Any mass exit from an aircraft contained by armed officers requires a scalable response dependent upon the number of people involved and the location of the aircraft.

4.2.3. An evacuation plan is likely to be implemented where there is an operational requirement to control all those exiting an aircraft in a manner that appropriately minimises the risk to the evacuees, whilst maximising the safety of the responders and investigative and forensic opportunities.

4.2.4. This requires the identification of hostage takers, who may be mixed with the evacuees and could pose a threat to those in close proximity.

4.2.5. The appropriate combination of armed and unarmed responders deployed together, with suitable training and equipment, should provide effective control measures to mitigate the assessed threat.

4.2.6. This section of the guidance is supported by 'Appendix A', which outlines some tactical configurations that could be employed when dealing with a controlled evacuation from an aircraft.

4.3. Development of a mass exit response within the GRP

4.3.1. The circumstances under which passengers leave an aircraft will, to a large extent, dictate the police response. The scale and complexity of the police plan largely depends upon the amount of prior notice and the extent to which the police are able to control events.

4.3.2. The development of a response for mass exit within the GRP should, where possible, establish:

- suitable marshalling point for resources and equipment
- potential or specific locations from where the mass exit will commence identified DSA
- immediate response to the identification of hostage taker(s)
- processing of evacuees who provide critical information, intelligence or evidential opportunities
- method for removal and any transport of evacuees from first contact to the point of safety (i.e. the point at which it is determined they do not present/are exposed to a threat)
- requirement for specialist support such as explosive ordnance disposal
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal and forensic management
- requirement for an appropriate medical response
- Transition process for evacuees from the first point of safety into the Hostage Reception Centre (HRC)

4.4. Operational command considerations

4.4.1. Close liaison is required between operational commanders during any mass exit. This may be particularly relevant where unarmed and/or non-police assets are deployed (e.g. military personnel). The TFC should, through effective briefing, ensure that command protocols and operational plans are fully understood. Where negotiation is a key part of the plan, close coordination between the TFC and the negotiator coordinator is required. Evacuees may emerge quickly and may be disorientated. Unless clear instruction and direction is given, the evacuees may act in a random and uncoordinated manner to escape the threat. This may be misinterpreted as non-compliance. The contingency planning should therefore include both an armed and unarmed response.

4.4.2. The use of police dogs to support the containment plan during a mass exit may provide a deterrent or response to any subjects contemplating or attempting escape.

4.4.3. In order to successfully coordinate plans and contingencies, the TFC may consider the support and advice available from:

- OSC
- investigating officer or SIO
- forensic coordinator
- negotiator coordinator
- military advisor
- transport support advisor
- support facilities advisor (HRC, support infrastructure)
- airport operator
- airline operator/handling agent

4.5. Movement of evacuees

4.5.1. From the point at which contact is first made with evacuees, an assessment regarding their status as a hostage or hostage taker should commence. Depending on the circumstances, there may be a need to move evacuees whilst this assessment takes place. Consideration should be given to the speed and extent to which this movement can be safely achieved, particularly where no search, or a cursory search, of the evacuees has taken place.

4.5.2. If there is a requirement to move evacuees any distance to the DSA, HRC or RA, the method for achieving this should be included in the tactical plan. This element of the plan should include:

- the extent to which armed and unarmed officers are required
- directing evacuees
- moving less able bodied evacuees or those passengers of restricted movement (PRM)
- suitable transportation

4.5.3. Where large numbers of evacuees may require transportation, access to buses or coaches should be arranged and on standby. Suitably trained/qualified drivers and pre-planned routes should be considered. When coaches or other vehicles are used to transport evacuees from the stronghold to the DSA or HRC, the following should be taken into consideration:

- If possible, police drivers should drive the coaches.
- Coaches must be searched prior to the loading of evacuees and after their disembarkation from the coach.
- If seated coaches are used, each seat number must correspond to each evacuee (there should not be standing room on seated coaches).
- There must be a police presence on the coach whilst conveying the evacuees to the DSA/HRC. This could be firearms officers and/or investigation officers dependent upon the assessment of threat and risk.
- If possible, one coach should be used per one load of evacuees (i.e. the same coach should not be used to go back and forth to collect more evacuees). If this is not possible, searches must still be conducted both prior and after each load of evacuees is conveyed and that fact documented.
- Within airports, it is accepted that airside coaches with seating may be unavailable and that they may not be driven by police officers due to airside safety rules and regulations.

4.6. Intelligence, investigative and forensic considerations

4.6.1. During a mass exit, where practicable, consideration should be given to deploying dedicated intelligence/evidence gathering officers. These officers should be provided with sufficient guidance to achieve the specific information/intelligence requirements and deployed at an appropriate time and location within the mass exit plan agreed by the TFC. Where it is not possible

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to deploy dedicated intelligence officers, this function may be discharged by armed officers. Where this is the case there may be more flexibility in terms of time and location at which they can be utilised.

- 4.6.2. One of the key roles is to assist with identifying, during the early stages of the mass exit, anyone in possession of time critical information, intelligence or evidence. Evacuees in possession of time critical information, intelligence or evidence should then be fast-tracked into the established intelligence/investigative process, having undergone, where appropriate, the search process.
- 4.6.3. An agreed procedure for forensic recovery, in line with Operation Puristic, should be an integral part of the planning process. The plan should identify sufficient forensically trained staff and arresting officers to ensure the effective management of the anticipated number of evacuees. The forensic recovery team should operate beyond the search phase.
- 4.6.4. When armed officers are deployed supporting unarmed officers in a search capacity, consideration should be given to the potential risk of cross contamination of firearms residue.
- 4.6.5. However, the safety of the evacuees' and the tasked officers should not be compromised in order to maintain forensic integrity.
- 4.6.6. Operation Puristic commences at the point when, following a mass exit plan, any potential threat to the public or police from an evacuee no longer exists.

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5. Risk Assessment

5.1. The assessment has been made against risks and threats contained within this operational order and not with secondary issues

<i>Category</i>	<i>Risk</i>	<i>Mitigation</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
1.Containmentment	Media	ERP 27 Implement Flying Restrictions	No Media Coverage
2.Negotiation	Difficult communications with Hostage Takers	Use of language line	Successful Communication with Aircraft
	Technical problems with the aircraft	External communication devices	
3.Intervention	Death or serious injury to non hostages	Negotiation with Hostage Takers	Safe resolution
4.Mass Exit	Death or serious injury during mass exit	Controlled Mass Exit	Safe resolution
	Potential for hostages to escape during mass exit		

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6. Communications**Bristol Airport**

Counter Terrorism Boarder Police Office	01275 473515
CTPSW (on call DI)	01278 647268
Airport Police Office	01275 473875
	07702 113436
Airport Uniform (U99) Inspector	07702 114004
Main Exchange	0871 334 4444
Airport Control Centre (Emergency only)	01275 473400
Airport Duty Manager	01275 473424
Mobile	07774135975
Air Traffic Control	01275 473712
Air Traffic Control (Training Room/Silver)	01275 473862
Main Office	01275 472713
Chief Pilot (24 hours)	07810 054669
Alternative call out number	07811 229852
National Police Air Service Control (South Yorks)	01924 296044

7. Humanitarian Issues

This Order should be read in conjunction with:

[Force Emergency Response Plan No 0 Operation Plato](#)

[Force Emergency Response Plan No. 1 – Extreme Threat](#),

[Force Emergency Response Plan No 9 – *Response to airborne security event*](#).

[Force Emergency Response Plan No 10 - *Operation HighFlyer*](#)

[\(*Armed patrols at Bristol Airport*\)](#).

[Force Emergency Response Plan No 21 Operation Puristic](#).

[Force Emergency Response Plan No 33 Aircrash Bristol Airport](#)

Appendix A - Mass exit tactical configurations

In the following configurations the initial intelligence/evidence gathering officers are deployed alongside the armed officers. Where safe and practicable to do so, it supports the identification of time critical information or evidence, and 'fast tracking' of individuals into the search phase.

Mass exit from aircraft (Figure 1)

Depending on the environment, consideration may be given to the use of ballistically protected vehicles (BPVs) or other portable ballistic protection (PBP).

This will allow for officers to move safely within sight of the aircraft where people are/have exited but a significant threat from within the aircraft may still exist.

Evacuees should be guided towards the first point of police control by the use of physical barriers, cones or police tape. At this point armed officers may be deployed in support of unarmed officers to provide an initial filter at which evacuees are searched and hostage takers may be identified. The result of this search and/or assessment determines how those evacuees and any hostage takers are dealt with from that point onwards.

It should be noted the graphics below provide indicative examples and they should not be viewed as prescriptive. Variations may be driven by implications such as geography, available resources and assessment of threat.




Figure 1: Mass exit from aircraft

A dedicated area away from the coaches/transport can be used for anyone identified as being in possession of time critical intelligence or evidence. These individuals can then be fast tracked into the established intelligence/investigative process by utilising a separate vehicle. This would avoid any delay incurred if they were to be transported amongst the mass of evacuees.

Secure escorting of evacuees from an aircraft (Figure 2)

In this configuration the placement of armed officers in close proximity to the aircraft enables an early assessment of threat and appropriate mitigation prior to evacuees being filtered by unarmed officers, supported by armed officers. Evacuees can then be escorted to a point where they can be dealt with safely, and those with time critical information or evidence can be 'fast tracked'.




Figure 2: Secure escorting of evacuees from an aircraft

A dedicated area away from the coaches can be used for anyone identified as being in possession of time critical intelligence or evidence. These individuals can then be fast tracked into the established intelligence/investigative process by utilising a separate vehicle.

Spontaneous exodus from an aircraft (Figure 3)

This configuration may be considered in preparation or response to a large scale break-out (exodus) from an aircraft which is being contained by armed officers.

Due to the spontaneous nature of such an exodus/breakout it may be necessary to use armed officers to deal with all of the initial elements of the response. These armed officers may form a cordon to prevent evacuees spilling out of the controlled area and it may be appropriate to use police dogs as a contingency to ensure containment is maintained.




Figure 3: Spontaneous exodus from an aircraft

A dedicated area away from the coaches can be used for anyone identified as being in possession of time critical intelligence or evidence. These individuals can then be fast tracked into the established intelligence/investigative process by utilising a separate vehicle.

Controlled evacuation, incorporating an investigative capability (Figure 4)

This configuration could be used where the opportunity exists for evacuees to leave the aircraft in manageable groups and be escorted by armed officers to guarded holding areas where investigators are located. These holding areas should be located at a safe distance from the aircraft. Where appropriate, unarmed officers may be deployed to assist this process.





Figure 4: Controlled evacuation, incorporating an investigative capability

A dedicated area away from the coaches can be used for anyone identified as being in possession of time critical intelligence or evidence. These individuals can then be fast tracked into the established intelligence/investigative process by utilising a separate vehicle.

Medical aid

In any of the configurations shown, medical support can be integrated. This may be required where evacuees have been held for prolonged periods of time or other medical risks have been identified. Some elements of triage and prioritisation may be required but this process should also be cognisant of any potential security risk. Where urgent care and transport to hospital is required the deployment of an ambulance(s) within the configurations shown could be considered.

Appendix B – Rendezvous Points



Appendix C – First Officer at Scene initial actions



IN EVENT OF HAVING TO SPEAK TO AIRCRAFT;

- Work with a colleague - update the control room with information/intelligence
- Be clear that you are not in charge and not a trained police negotiator
- Seek early release of hostage
- Listen! Make no assumptions about the motivation
- Get them talking and keep them talking to buy time for the policing response
- When directed, brief police negotiator and handover

Suggested Initial Opening Contact Phrases:-

Hello, my name is.....This is extremely important. I want to get you a specially trained police negotiator. Please give me a telephone number so they can speak to you

Hello, my name is..... I work with the Police. I can only imagine what is happening on the aircraft. We are taking this very seriously, I am here to listen to you whilst I get you a specialist police negotiator. They are the best people to speak to you

Hello, my name is..... I work with the Police. I am here to listen to you and understand what it is you want. My intention is to get you in contact with a specialist trained negotiator as soon as possible

Priority conversations:

- Health of persons on board including attackers. Try not to refer to passengers/crew as hostages
- Their intention
- Their motivation

Action Card - Force Incident Manager

Following a Hijacking of a landing, or grounded aircraft, the following actions should be considered.

This may not be a fully exhaustive list and the person performing this role may be required to implement or consider other duties commensurate with the responsibilities of the post.

1.	The Force Incident Manager will act as the Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) until relieved
2.	Switch on Body Worn Video and declare the activation of a Ground Response Plan and record the rationale
3.	FIM or FDO to contact the Airport Uniform Police Post (U99) on 01275 473875 or 07702 113436 to establish that RVP1 (Main), which is located at the Silverzone Gate S2 opposite the Police Administration building at Lulsgate House will be the RVP and if on duty request the Airport Inspector to be the Non-Firearms Bronze
4.	Deploy all available Armed Response Vehicles including an OFC, CTSFO's if appropriate with an armoured Land Rover, Maximum response time 60 minutes from Cardiff South West (JFU) containing ladders to the initial RVP depending on the threat before then placing on an initial armed containment
5.	Consider deploying local unarmed officers to assist with the setting up of appropriate, • RVP's • FCP (Landside/Airside access points) • traffic control points, • approach routes • securing of a Landing Zone for incoming Specialist Assets.
6.	Contact a ground TFC and Firearms Tactical Advisor (TACAD) and deploy to the initial RVP for armed police resources
7.	Contact and brief the on-call negotiators
8.	Contact and inform Blue light emergency services control rooms either by landline or via Airwave on the relevant ESICTRL talk group channel and request the information to be passed onto their National Interagency Liaison Officer (NILO)
9.	Arrange Op LINK multi agency teleconference call via the on-call duty ops Planning Officer, to set up a tactical co-ordination group.
10.	Consider requesting armed assets from surrounding Forces to assist if deemed necessary
11.	Contact and brief the Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC) who may consider requesting Military assistance through the Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA)
12.	If the SFC has requested assistance through the MACA and approval is pending contact and notify the Specialist Military Task Group Headquarters (TGHQ) on 0191 2395391 or secondary number of 0191 2395390 if required and ask to be put through to the MAB2 duty operations officer to inform them that military support has been requested in respect to the ground response of a Highjacked aircraft, and also notify SO15 and the Home Office Homeland Security Group
13.	Inform the HSG Operational Policy Team on 0300 0726661 or on 0300 1061976 who have a crucial role in managing all MACA requests if requested.
14.	Contact the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Cell SO15 Reserve number is 0207 2309015 (24hrs)
15.	Contact CT Boarder Force on 01275 473515 and CTP SW on call Di on 01278 647268
16.	Delegate call handler to contact Airport Control Centre on 01275 473400 to establish communication process and confirm the implementation of the Critical management Centre..
17.	Contact and inform the National Armed Policing Co-Ordination Office (NAPCO) on-call officer on 0207 1758900 who support the Senior National Coordinator-Prevent and Pursue (SNC-Prevent and Pursue) who if required can mobilise the Counter Terrorist Specialised Firearms Officer Intervention Response Teams (CTSFO IRT) that are located around the country. Also be prepared to deliver crucial information within the M/ETHANE report and confirm what Airwave Hailing Group is being used

Action Card - Operational Firearms Commander (OFC)

Following a Hijacking of a landing, or grounded aircraft, the following actions should be considered.

This may not be a fully exhaustive list and the person performing this role may be required to implement or consider other duties commensurate with the responsibilities of the post.

1.	Attend the initial RVP for firearms officers. This will be RVP1 (Main), which is located at the Silverzone Gate S2 opposite the Police Administration building at Lulsgate, but this depends on the location of the threat.
2.	Liaise with Non-Firearms Bronze/Airport Police staff (U99)/Security Staff prior to deploying Armed Response Vehicles airside.
3.	Deploy initial armed containment.
4.	Co-ordinate deployment of Specialist Firearms Officers.

Action Card – Non Firearms Bronze

Following a Hijacking of a landing, or grounded aircraft, the following actions should be considered.

This may not be a fully exhaustive list and the person performing this role may be required to implement or consider other duties commensurate with the responsibilities of the post.

1.	Attend Police RV point. This will be RVP1 (Main), which is located at the Silverzone Gate S2 opposite the Police Administration building at Lulsgate House.
2.	Liaise with Ground TFC/OFC/Airport Police staff (U99)/Security Staff.
3.	Make contact with Airport Duty Manager 01275 473424 or 07774135975. Consider public evacuation of terminal if necessary. Establish and disseminate Air Traffic Control/Airport plans for dealing with non-involved aircraft/passengers
4.	Confirm precisely where the aircraft has come to a halt and confirm with the airport or air traffic control that all other aircraft movements have been stopped (and hence the airport being safe from other aircraft),
5.	Confirm method of communication with the aircraft (via air traffic control most likely),
6.	Confirm most appropriate RVP. All via a METHANE report.
7.	Implement Outer Cordon/Traffic Plan.
8.	It is likely that FIM will nominate a 'Critical Incident Commander' to take over from you at an early stage. Airport managers will set up the airport's Crisis Management Centre (CMC). This will become the Multi Agency Centre (MAC). The Incident Silver will be a key member of the CMC as this is where you will have to manage the response of the business partners within the airport. Through CMC you can ensure that they are operating in a safe manner and supporting the policing objectives. As the senior officer on the ground you or your representative may well have to liaise with the CMC in order to manage the actions of the business partners until Silver attends to take over from you.

Action Card – Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC)

Following a Hijacking of a landing, or grounded aircraft, the following actions should be considered.

This may not be a fully exhaustive list and the person performing this role may be required to implement or consider other duties commensurate with the responsibilities of the post.

1.	Attend Silver Control and take over command from FIM.
2.	Refer to/ carryout protocols set out in ERP 1 (Extreme Threat).
3.	Establish contact with SFC/OFC and Outside Bronze Commanders
4.	Liaise with senior Airport Management and other emergency services until the Critical incident manager (CIM) takes over this role.

Action Card – Critical Incident Manager (CIM) & Silver Commander

Following a Hijacking of a landing, or grounded aircraft, the following actions should be considered.

This may not be a fully exhaustive list and the person performing this role may be required to implement or consider other duties commensurate with the responsibilities of the post.

Airport managers will set up the airport's Crisis Management Centre (CMC). This is the MAC. The Police Silver will be a key member of the CMC as this is where you will have to manage the response of the business partners and other emergency services. This will ensure that they operate in a safe manner and supporting the policing objectives. If you do not attend CMC yourself you will need to send a representative with an equivalent level to you in order to manage the response of business partners.

1.	Establish Tactical Co-ordinating Centre (preferably within the CMC or Police Administration Building, Lulsgate House).
2.	Establish contact with SFC
3.	Establish contact with the Airport Officer Threat Assessor (AOTA) which at Bristol Airport is the Airport Duty Manager on 01275 473424 or 07774135975 who will co-locate at the co-ordinating centre at the FCP and act as a conduit between the emergency services response and the airport operator enabling access to resources and infrastructure
3.	Refer to/carry out protocols set out in ERP 1 (Extreme Threat).
4.	Establish contact with TFC, OFC and Bronze Commanders.
5	Attend CMC or send a representative of equivalent level to you to CMC

Action Card – U99 and First Officers at scene	
Following a Hijacking of a landing, or grounded aircraft, the following actions should be considered. This may not be a fully exhaustive list and the person performing this role may be required to implement or consider other duties commensurate with the responsibilities of the post.	
Officer 1	
1.	Contact FIM and raise a log
2.	Ensure on duty /on call Counter Terrorism Policing South West are informed
3.	WhatsApp the team for resource support
4.	Consider use of U99 PCSO if on duty to manage RVP
5.	Consider, determine and communicate the initial RVP
6.	This should be RVP1 unless there are factors which mean another RVP is more appropriate. This will depend on location and type of incident. Consider safe and suitable location in consultation with FIM / FDO.
7.	Attend and open RVP (code 3690)
8.	Manage emergency responder vehicles
9.	Please see RVP card for further info
Officer 2	
1.	Attend National Air Traffic Services (NATS) in the air traffic tower. (ATC) (emergency phone number 01275473712) w3w locked.ferrying.spelling
2.	NATS retain ownership of the aircraft until it is on the ground. Officer 2 may be asked to be the initial contact and conduit of information between the hijacker/ police and NATS and may be asked to have the initial conversation. The officer is solely responsible for the exchange of information between the aircraft, NATS and the police See Appendix C for instructions re speaking to hijacker/ aggressor
3.	Officer is probably best placed to deliver METHANE message
Officer 3	
1.	Attend Airport Control Room based at Gate 10 on the western walkway. (phone number 01274 473400 emergency number) and liaise with Airport Duty Manager 01275 473737. Consider safety and evacuation if appropriate
2.	Officer to contact CTPSW, Border force and Airport Duty Manager