Somerset Council

Major Accident Hazard Pipelines Emergency Plan

Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996

This plan supports the response to a MAHP related incident in Somerset and should be used in conjunction with the Corporate Emergency Response & Recovery Plan.

To activate this plan, turn to section 2.7: link

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Version Control

Version Number		Amendments By	
Number	Date	Name and Initials	Action
1.6	November 2017	C Thomson	Plan Review & Update
1.7	November 2020	J Barker	Plan Review & Update
1.8	August 2021	J. Tittley	Plan Review & Update
1.9	September 2022	J. Tittley	Contact details & unitary alignment
1.10	January 2025	N Dawson	Plan Review & Update

Contact List

Name	Number
National Gas National Control Centre.	0800 614043 **Emergency** **0800 111999**
Wales and West Utilities Gas Operations Controller (Control Room)	Ex-Dir Section 19.6 Somerset Emergency Telephone Directory

Associated Plans & Guidance

- Corporate Emergency Response and Recovery Plan
- Other specific multi-agency or internal plans
- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)

- A guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, HSE https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l82.htm
- Further guidance on emergency plans for major accident hazard pipelines, HSE https://www.hse.gov.uk/pipelines/emergencyplanpipe.pdf

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A&S LRF	Avon & Somerset Local Resilience Forum
A&SC	Avon & Somerset Constabulary
AGI	Above Ground Installation
CCA (2004)	Civil Contingencies Act (2004)
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
D&SFRS	Devon & Somerset Fire and Rescue Service
DEFRA	Department for Education, Food and Rural Affairs
EPD	Emergency Planning Distance. The distance from the pipeline within which detailed emergency planning takes place in the event of an unignited pipeline leak.

EPO	Emergency Planning Officer
EPRR	Emergency Planning Response & Recovery
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
CERRP	Corporate Emergency Response & Recovery Plan
ECC	Emergency Control Centre
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme
LA	Local Authority
LTS	Local Transmission System
MAHP	Major Accident Hazard Pipeline
MHCLG – RED	Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government – Resilience and Emergencies Division
MIT	Major Incident Team
NG	National Gas
NGECC	National Gas Emergency Contact Centre
NTS	National Transmission System
RCG	Recovery Coordinating Group
RWG	Recovery Working Group
SC	Somerset Council
SCG	Strategic Coordinating Group
SC EPRR	Somerset Council's Emergency Planning, Response & Recovery Team
STAC	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell
SWAST	South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust
TCG	Tactical Coordinating Group
WWU	Wales and West Utilities

Preface

The Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 require Somerset Council to prepare and maintain an adequate plan for dealing with a major accident involving any of the notified Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) within its area of authority.

This document seeks to minimise the effects on the public in the vicinity of a major accident to the high-pressure natural gas MAHP within Somerset. It defines the responsibilities of and the actions to be taken by the pipeline operators, emergency services and other agencies in responding to an incident. It has been prepared, and will be amended as required, by the Somerset Council Emergency Planning team in consultation with the organisations listed below:

- National Gas Transmission
- Wales & West Utilities Ltd
- Health & Safety Executive
- Avon and Somerset Police
- Devon & Somerset Fire and Rescue Service
- South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust
- NHS Somerset Integrated Care Board
- National Highways
- UK Health Security Agency – South West
- Environment Agency – South West Region
- Somerset Council

Each participating organisation is responsible for the contents, testing and revision of its own procedures to ensure that it can fulfil its responsibilities within this overall plan. Somerset Council's Emergency Planning, Response and Recovery team will periodically organise and hold exercises to test the arrangements recorded within this emergency plan.

All participating organisations are requested to notify Somerset Council's Emergency Planning, Response and Recovery team of any changes within their area of responsibility, which will require amendment of the existing arrangements within this document.

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Part 1 – Summary

1.1 Background

This plan refers to Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) notified to Somerset Council by the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), which comprise the National Transmission System (NTS) owned and operated by National Gas and the Local Transmission System (LTS) owned and operated by Wales & West Utilities. Both systems deliver natural gas via large diameter, highly pressurised pipe networks.

The aim of this plan is to provide details of the arrangements to be taken to minimise the consequences to the county of Somerset in the event of an emergency involving a MAHP.

Somerset Council is responsible for producing and reviewing this emergency plan, which outlines the roles of the organisations likely to be involved in responding to and coping with any major accident to these pipelines. This duty is delivered through the Somerset Council's Emergency Planning, Response and Recovery team.

1.2 Potential Hazards

Damage to any of the notified pipelines or Above Ground Installations (AGIs) could release highly compressed natural gas, which has low toxicity but high flammability. A ruptured pipe or damaged installation may produce a gas jet above ground while a pinhole leak below ground could contaminate the soil and may create a 'marsh gas' situation leading to the possibility of an explosion.

1.3 Hazard Areas

The hazard area beyond which cordons should be set in the event of damage is calculated with reference to Emergency Planning Distance. This distance varies with the diameter and working pressure of the pipeline.

1.4 Notification

The first notification of any incident involving a MAHP (either NTS or LTS) may be made to the Police, Fire or Ambulance through the 999 system or to the National Gas Emergency Contact Centre. The emergency services have routine procedures for informing the operators of leaks and ruptures reported by 999 calls. Landowners with MAHPs running through their land also hold details of emergency contact with pipeline operators.

1.5 Pipeline Operator Response

The MAHP Local Transmission System (LTS) is operated by Wales & West Utilities (WWU), based in Newport, South Wales.

Operation of the National Transmission System (NTS) is carried out by National Gas (NG), based in Warwick.

Call-handling of The National Gas Emergency Service is maintained by the National Gas Emergency Contact Centre (NGECC).

NG/WWU will investigate any report of a gas leak at any location and if they identify the site as being that of a Major Accident Hazard Pipeline, they will initiate the planned response. This involves: notifying the Emergency Services and through them the appropriate Local Authorities; who will establish a Major Incident Team (MIT) at the relevant operator's offices.

The MIT will then nominate an Onsite Incident Controller who will direct the operator's response at the scene of the incident and will be available to the Emergency Services' Strategic, Tactical or Operational Controls for advice, if needed.

1.6 Command & Control

The Fire Service will be in control of the inner cordon command. The police will be responsible for the management and control of the outer cordon.

A Forward Control Point (FCP) will be established near the scene by the responding emergency services, to co-ordinate the operational response.

A Tactical Coordinating Centre will be established at a location away from the scene where the police will co-ordinate the response of the organisations involved.

Where circumstances dictate, particularly where a Major Incident has been declared, a multi-agency Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may be established.

The local authority services involved will be alerted by the Somerset Council's Duty Emergency Planning Officer and where appropriate, will be responsible for providing temporary accommodation for those persons evacuated from the hazardous area. Somerset Council will provide a Local Authority Tactical Officer to attend the police tactical control and will alert other departments and agencies likely to be involved.

1.7 Mapping

It is the responsibility of all agencies to ensure they have appropriate access to any maps that may be required.

Maps of Major Accident Hazard Pipelines within the county of Somerset are available on request through Resilience Direct Mapping.

Maps and GIS data can also be requested from National Gas Transmission (NTS pipeline operator) or Wales & West Utilities (LTS pipeline operator).

Below is a pipeline location map for Somerset. Please note that this only shows the National Transmission System, and does not above ground installations, Local Transmission Systems or response centres such as forward control points or rest centres.



Part 2 – Plan Detail

2.1 Statutory Background and Scope

2.1.1 The Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996

This plan is made in accordance with The Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR), which ensure the integrity of Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP). Under these regulations, Somerset Council is required to produce an emergency plan for all MAHP within the County.

2.1.2 Operator Responsibilities

Pipeline operators are required to satisfy certain conditions relating to the design, construction, installation, ownership, operation, examination, maintenance and renewal of pipeline systems, to make arrangements for safety measures and for decommissioning the pipeline. They must also make arrangements for dealing with incidents and emergencies and take appropriate steps to provide information to organisations/persons of the existence and whereabouts of the pipeline in order to ensure the prevention of damage.

Before the design of any MAHP is completed, the operators are required to prepare a Major Accident Prevention Document, in which they have evaluated the risks arising from all hazards with the potential to cause a major accident and describe an adequate safety management system. No fluid must be conveyed unless the organisation and arrangements for appropriate emergency procedures under different circumstances are established and recorded. These organisations, arrangements and procedures should be tested and revised as often as may be appropriate.

2.1.3 Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP)

The plan refers to pipelines notified to Somerset Council by the HSE, comprising the National Transmission System (NTS) owned and operated by National Gas and the Local Transmission System (LTS) owned and operated by Wales & West Utilities. Both systems deliver natural gas in bulk quantities via large diameter, highly pressurised pipe networks, and include below-ground pipework connected by above ground installations (AGIs) which control the flow of gas. Short lengths of pipeline may run above ground, for instance when crossing some roads and railway lines.

2.2 The Aim

The aim of this plan is to provide details of the arrangements to be taken to minimise the consequences to the county of Somerset in the event of an emergency involving a MAHP.

2.3 MAHP in Somerset

2.3.1 National Transmission System (NTS) MAHP in Somerset

One line enters the county to the west of Midsomer Norton (Bath & North-East Somerset) and continues in a southerly direction to the outskirts of Ilchester, where it divides into three pipelines. One spur runs south-east, bypassing Yeovil to the north and crossing into Dorset. The other two pipelines run south-west, re-joining each other to the northwest of Ilminster, and then dividing again northeast of Ilminster before crossing into Devon.

The route avoids any substantial centres of population. However, it crosses a number of major roads and railway lines.

The NTS is owned and operated by National Gas, Warwick.

2.3.2 Local Transmission System (LTS) MAHP in Somerset

One line enters the county to the west of Midsomer Norton (Bath & North-East Somerset) and continues in a southerly direction to the outskirts of Ilchester. It then follows closely the line of the NTS south-westerly pipeline above (and at 2 locations actually crosses it), then turns north-west, dividing into two for a few miles before merging again and continuing to the north of Taunton and ending outside Watchet on the north coast of the County.

As above, the route avoids centres of population, but crosses a number of main roads and railway lines, including the M5 motorway.

The LTS is owned and operated by Wales & West Utilities, Newport.

2.3.3 Pipeline Parameters

There are 2 specifications of pipeline: ‘R’ type, which runs through rural areas; and ‘S’ type, which runs through suburban areas. ‘S’ type pipeline, which is constructed using thicker walls is operated at a reduced operating stress, making full-bore rupture of the pipe a non-credible event.

2.3.4 Control Installations

Gas flow is controlled at Above Ground Installations (AGIs) where valves and complex pipe work are arranged to allow control of pressure and flow rates, internal inspection by remote-control vehicles and general maintenance.

There is automatic control of most functions at these installations with remote monitoring so that supply can be adjusted according to demand and rapid action can

be taken should there be loss of containment for any reason. Gas flow is also controlled by Block Valves at intervals of several kilometres.

2.4 Pipeline Failure

2.4.1 System Integrity

The integrity of the system is maintained by emphasis on careful engineering and surveillance. Safety factors incorporated at the design stage reduce the risk of a breach in the system due to corrosion or minor damage. Awareness of potential hazards (for instance from third party human activity such as construction work) is maintained by regular helicopter overflight of the whole system and a quadrennial walked inspection.

2.4.2 Causes of Failure

Failure of the pipeline may have either an internal (operator related) or an external origin. Internal causes would include mechanical failure of materials or construction, or operational or maintenance problems. Examples of external events that could cause failure would be earth movements, severe weather, third party activities (accidental or deliberate) and accidents (including domino effect from neighbouring sites).

For ‘R’ type pipelines, the worst-case event associated with pipeline failure would occur as a result of a full-bore pipeline failure i.e. ruptures.

For ‘S’ type pipelines, a full-bore pipeline rupture is not a credible event, as a result of design and operating conditions. A significantly more likely consequence of a pipeline failure on ‘S’ types is a hole in the pipeline, which does not develop into a full rupture leading to a leak of pressurised gas. The worst case would be a leak of 150mm equivalent diameter.

Subsequent events can range from immediate ignition, through delayed remote ignition, to no ignition at all.. The likelihood of ignition depends on the nature and size of the gas release, and whether or not the gas is able to accumulate in flammable quantities, for instance by being contained within a building.

It should be noted that a pipeline rupture is a very unlikely event and is only predicted to happen under very limited circumstances. This could be, for example, as a result of repeated strikes on the pipeline by very large excavation machinery. If a pipeline rupture did occur then the affected area would be a circle centred on the pipeline with a radius equal to the maximum thermal hazard range. Where the emergency planning distance is less than the thermal hazard range then the baseline plan, based on the emergency planning distance, should include sufficient flexibility that it can be extended to deal with events resulting in the Maximum Thermal Hazard Ranges.

2.5 Potential Hazards

2.5.1 Natural Gas Properties

Natural gas is mainly methane, which is lighter than air and disperses readily. It is not likely to form a plume of any significance and has low toxicity though it may asphyxiate by physical exclusion of oxygen. Hazards mainly stem from the considerable potential energy stored in the compressed gas and its flammability. However, accumulation within an enclosed space such as a building may produce an explosive mix with air.

Steps should be taken to ensure that potential ignition sources are not introduced into the area around the release where gas could potentially be present in flammable concentrations.

National Gas's Major Accident Hazard Pipelines contain unodorised gas (i.e. do not have the characteristic smell of gas). It should not therefore be assumed that if gas cannot be smelt that individuals are at a safe distance.

2.5.2 Stored Energy

The considerable potential energy stored in the compressed gas within the system may be released with explosive force if the pipeline is damaged. From a buried pipe, the surrounding matrix is likely to direct the gas jet vertically upwards, generating considerable noise, throwing soil and pipe debris a considerable distance, and forming a crater.
Noise levels due to escaping gas can be deafening in the immediate vicinity and cause fear and apprehension at greater distances.

2.5.3 Torches (Ignited Jets)

Gas leaking from a damaged MAHP may catch fire and form a burning jet. The greatest hazard then becomes the flame and the heat radiated from it. This in turn may ignite surrounding flammable structures or materials leading to harmful consequences for people in the vicinity, damage to property and the environment. However, it is important that NO steps are taken to extinguish an ignited jet without the agreement of the pipeline operators.

2.5.4 Pinhole Leaks

An alternative set of hazards may follow from pinhole perforation of a buried pipe with accumulation of gas in the surrounding soil. Pinhole leaks cause less reduction of gas flow than full bore ruptures and are less easily detected. The hazards from pinhole-sized leaks include cooling of the surroundings as the gas decompresses,

death of surface vegetation and ignition hazards (including explosion) resembling those of firedamp or marsh gas.

2.6 Emergency Planning Distances (Hazard Areas)

2.6.1 Emergency Planning Distance

This is the minimum safe distance from the scene of the incident. This varies with the diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline. The maximum EPD for any pipeline in Somerset is 288m.

2.6.2 Maximum Thermal Hazard Range

The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range is the maximum distance away from the pipeline where it is calculated that individuals could come to harm as a result of a pipeline failure and the resulting thermal radiation if the resultant gas escape ignites. The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range assumes a full-bore pipeline failure (rupture). This also varies with the diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline. The maximum THR for any pipeline in Somerset is 288m.

Most sections of pipeline have an EPD greater than the THR. However, in some sections this is reversed. From 2009, the Emergency Planning Distance and the Thermal Hazard Range are considered to be contiguous for all MAHP pipelines in Somerset. For planning purposes, therefore, the Hazard Area will be whichever is the greater of the two for that section of pipeline.

2.6.3 Emergency Control Points

If Emergency Control Points are being set up it is suggested that the Emergency Control Points and the general public shall initially be located at the specified distance of the Outer Cordon contained in the Local Authority emergency plan. When National Gas personnel arrive on site they will be able to advise whether it is appropriate to reduce this distance.

2.7 Activation

If the emergency services or the pipeline operator confirm that they are dealing with a serious incident on a MAHP, this plan must be activated. For the purposes of the plan a serious incident covers a fire, explosion or uncontrolled emission at a MAHP or where there is an identified risk of any of these occurring.

Any of the emergency services may additionally declare a ‘Major Incident’, thereby activating previously agreed multi-agency arrangements, which will supplement the provisions of this plan (see Glossary).

The pipeline operator must assess the incident and determine the exact location and severity of the incident including the amount of the gas or fuel product released. Consideration must also be given to whether the incident has a potential to affect the community either directly via a fire, explosion or damage to property or indirectly through the loss of gas/fuel product supply.

2.7.1 Warning Chain

When a MAHP incident has been confirmed, the pipeline operator will alert Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service’s Control Room through the 999 service. On receipt, Control will alert Avon and Somerset Constabulary who will activate the Avon & Somerset Op-Link protocol.

Where the incident occurs on or near a railway or is likely to affect the running of the railway or its infrastructure, Avon & Somerset Constabulary will notify British Transport Police and Network Rail.

Receipt of such a message by the Somerset Duty Emergency Planning Officer automatically activates this emergency plan and subsequent alerts are indicated in the warning chain. For incidents affecting strategic roads, Somerset Highways will alert National Highways, as necessary.

2.7.2 Required Information

The information cascade should include the following details where possible as well as any other relevant information:

M/ETHANE is the common recognised model for passing incident information between services and organisations promoting interoperability:

- **M**ajor Incident Declared?
- **E**xact location
- **T**ype of Incident
- **H**azards present and potential
- **A**ccess routes which are safe to use
- **N**umber, type and severity of casualties
- **E**mergency services present and required

Other information, where known, which should be passed includes:

- Pipeline operator

- Pipeline content
- Pipeline operating pressure
- Pipeline name, pipeline section reference and / or Ordnance Survey Grid Reference
- Wind direction and speed
- Extent of escape
- Extent of damage
- Identity and contact number of caller.

2.8 Response

2.8.1 National Gas Response (NTS)

Notification to National Gas of a gas release or damage that may be associated with an above 7 bar g pipeline or associated with an above ground installation.

- National Gas would dispatch a First Call Operative to the location of the incident to confirm details of the incident.
- If confirmed as a significant incident a member of National Gas's Operation Emergency Personnel team would be dispatched to the location of the incident to confirm that it is an above 7 bar pipeline. He/she would manage the initial emergency response local to the scene, including the safeguarding of life and property.

Pipeline Damage

- National Gas would prevent any increase in pipeline pressure.
- A risk assessment would be carried out and if necessary a safe evacuation distance would be identified.
- A competent National Gas Inspector would assess the damage
- Depending on the severity of the damage and the criticality of the damage National Gas may set up an Incident Management Team (see Section 6.2) this team will be in overall control of the incident.
- National Gas would then make any necessary pressure reductions and manage the gas transmission system to ensure continuity of supplies to gas consumers;

Gas Release

- National Gas would dispatch an Onsite Incident Controller to the scene of the incident; this individual would be responsible for the co-ordination of the National Gas emergency response at the location of the incident.
- A risk assessment would be carried out and a safe evacuation distance would be identified.
- National Gas would set up an Incident Management Team (see Section 6.2). This team will be in overall control of the management of the incident.
- National Gas would follow their emergency response procedures, this would include liaison with the emergency services and local authorities.
- National Gas would manage gas supplies to ensure continuity of supplies to gas consumers.

Repair and Recovery

National Gas response to emergencies would normally involve the following 3 areas of the company:-

National Gas Operations
The National Gas (NG) Gas Transmission pipeline System (NTS) is controlled remotely from the Gas National Control Centre (GNCC) and the high-pressure gas distribution pipelines (LTS) are controlled by the relevant Distribution National Control Centre (DNCC). Following a major incident, the appropriate Network Control Centre would take steps to mitigate the incident for example by closing remotely operable shut off valves. The Control Centre would also be in communication with and assist the NGECC and National Gaspersonnel. In the event of a major incident that could result in a Network gas supply emergency the nominated Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NG) would take control of the gas supply Network to ensure, where possible, that gas supplies to end users is maintained.

Front Line Response
The Engineers within the local NG area in which the incident occurs are responsible for assessing the scale of the incident in conjunction with the NG Gas National Control Centre (GNCC). If appropriate, depending upon the scale of the incident, an Incident Management Team would be set up. This team would be responsible for managing the emergency. An Incident Controller would be appointed. The Incident Controller would be responsible for co-ordinating the NG response to the incident including liaison with Local Authorities and emergency services and welfare organisations (to ensure that adequate provision is made for vulnerable members of the community).

National Gas Incident Control
On-Site Control
Where a serious incident has occurred a Local Incident Control Point should be set up. This should be as close as possible to the Public Emergency Services Forward Control Points

The incident will normally be managed on site on behalf of NG by NG Operational Staff.

Overall Control
Overall control of the incident by NG will be from an Incident Control Room at the appropriate NG office. The NG Incident Controller and the Incident Management Team must be based in the Incident Control Room.

Assistance that may be required by National Gas
It is important that ignited gas is not extinguished unless specifically requested by the onsite Controller.

The NG Incident Control procedure assumes the following services will be provided by Local Authorities or by the civil Emergency Services:

- Public announcements;
- Road and/or rail traffic and pedestrian control;
- Escort of personnel and/or equipment to site to avoid traffic congestion;
- Evacuation and care of persons at risk;
- Location of suitable rendezvous points and reception centre;
- Control of secondary fires;
- First aid and evacuation of injured.

Special Equipment
This plan should not rely on special equipment being provided to the Local Authority or emergency services by NG in order for them to respond to a pipeline incident.

Communication
Local Authorities should use the contact telephone numbers provided to them by NG. In the event of an incident the Local Authority must be put into contact with the NG Incident Control Room. During an incident a member of the NG Incident Management Team (IMT) must be nominated as a single point of contact for Local Authorities and Public Emergency Services. Once this individual has been nominated and made known to the Local Authority all further communications must be through this individual.

Roles and Responsibilities of Teams and Individuals

The First Call Operative (FCO)
Individual dispatched by the National Gas Emergency Service Call Centre (ECC) to attend the incident. The First Call Operative (FCO) will report back to the ECC details of the incident. The FCO will take the initial steps where appropriate to safeguard life and property. The FCO may not have the knowledge to state whether a MAHP is involved.

Onsite Control
Where a serious incident has occurred an Operations (Bronze) Incident Controller who can be identified by their tabard bearing the legend ‘National Gas, GAS, Incident Controller’ will be appointed and an Incident Control Point established (e.g. National Gas incident control vehicle or community hall). Where possible this will be as close as possible to the Public Emergency Services Incident Control Room.

The incident will normally be managed on site on behalf of National Gas by National Gas Operational Staff”.

NTS Incident Team

An incident team will be established in Warwick if appropriate, to take overall control of the gas element of the incident. The NTS Incident Team will communicate with the Emergency Services Tactical command by telephone or via the On-site Incident Controller.

2.8.2 Wales & West Utilities (LTS)

The WWU response to emergencies would normally involve the following 3 areas of the company:-

Gas Operations at WWUCC

The WWU Pipeline Network is controlled remotely from the Wales & West Utilities Control Centre. Following a major incident the Control Centre would take steps to mitigate the incident for example by closing remotely operable shut off valves. The Control Centre would also be in communication with, and assist the NGECC and WWU personnel. In the event of a major incident that could result in a Network gas supply emergency the nominated Network Emergency Co-ordinator (WWU) would take control of the gas supply. Network to ensure where possible that gas supplies to end users is maintained.

WWU Incident Team

An incident team will be established in Newport, to take overall control of the gas element of the incident. The WWU Incident Team will communicate with the Emergency Services Tactical command by telephone or via the On-site Incident Controller.

WWU Incident Control

On-Site Control

Where a serious incident has occurred a Local Incident Control Point should be set up (eg caravan or community hall), this should be as close as possible to the Public Emergency Services Incident Control Room.

WWU Operational Staff will normally manage the incident on site on behalf of WWU.

Overall Control

Overall control of the incident by WWU must be from an Incident Control Room at the appropriate WWU office. The WWU Incident Controller and the Incident Management Team must be based in the Incident Control Room. The interaction between the areas identified in Sections C.8 and C.10.

Assistance that may be required by WWU

It is important that ignited gas is not extinguished unless specifically requested by the WWU on site Controller.

The WWU Incident Control procedure assumes the following services will be provided by Local Authorities or by the civil Emergency Services:

- Public announcements.
- Road and/or rail traffic and pedestrian control;
- Escort of personnel and/or equipment to site to avoid traffic congestion;
- Evacuation and care of persons at risk;
- Location of suitable rendezvous points and reception centre;
- Control of secondary fires;
- First aid and evacuation of injured.

Special Equipment
This plan should not rely on special equipment being provided to the Local Authority or emergency services by WWU in order for them to respond to a pipeline incident.

Communication
Local Authorities should use the contact telephone numbers provided to them by WWU. In the event of an incident the Local Authority must be put into contact with the WWU Incident Control Room. During an incident a member of the WWU Incident Management Team must be nominated as a single point of contact for Local Authorities and Public Emergency Services. Once this individual has been nominated and made known to the Local Authority all further communications must be through this individual.

Contact between the media and WWU should be channelled through WWU's Corporate Affairs Manager or the Police Media spokesman.

Roles and Responsibilities of Teams and Individuals

The First Call Operative (FCO)
Individual dispatched by WWU Emergency Call Centre (ECC) to attend the incident. The First Call Operative (FCO) will report back to the ECC details of the incident. The FCO will take the initial steps where appropriate to safeguard life and property. The FCO may not have the knowledge to state whether a MAHP is involved.

Operational Emergency Personnel (OEP)
Operational Emergency Personnel is likely to be the second WWU Officer to attend at the Operational Control/Incident and will be responsible to categorising the nature and scale of the incident and report back to WWU management. The OEP will provide advice and guidance to the Emergency Services, if they are on site. The OEP may not have the knowledge to absolutely confirm whether a WWU MAHP is involved. The OEP should take the initial steps where appropriate to safeguard life and property.

On-Site Incident Controller (OIC)

The On-site Incident Controller (OIC) works for the WWU Local Transmission System and has the knowledge to confirm that an incident involves a WWU MAHP. OIC will take control of the incident for WWU and be the Tactical Controller. The OIC will provide advice and guidance to the Emergency Services, if they are on site.

WWU Incident Team

An incident team will be established in either Newport or Bristol if appropriate, to take overall control of the gas element of the incident. The WWU Incident Team will communicate with the Emergency Services Tactical command by telephone or via the On-site Incident Controller.

Figure 1 – MAHP Warning Chain



Note: The Police will initiate an 'Operation Link' notification message to all agencies within the Avon and Somerset Local Resilience Forum area. Operation Link allows for an initial multi agency teleconference to brief, inform and agree the control, coordination and communications response to the incident.

2.9 Command & Control

The command and control structure of the response to a declared Major Incident will follow the nationally accepted model for such incidents and JESIP principles and will be informed by the Avon and Somerset Local Resilience Forum's Major Incident Response Guide, if required.

2.9.1 Response Phase

The management of the response can be divided into three levels:

1. Operational
2. Tactical
3. Strategic

The requirement to implement one or more of these management levels will be very dependent on the nature and severity of the incident. Usually, MAHP incidents will involve an operational and tactical response, if the incident is severe, it may require a response from the strategic level.

The three management levels are recognised in this plan. This enables the integration of management processes across the responding agency boundaries. It is not intended that the management levels necessarily predetermine the rank or seniority of the individual discharging the functions.

It is a characteristic of the command and control chain that it tends to be created from the bottom up. At the start of any incident for which there has been no warning the operational level will be activated first, with other levels coming into being with the escalation of the incident or a greater awareness of the situation.

Operational Level

The first response to any incident will normally be by the emergency services. On arrival at the scene of an incident, the emergency services will take appropriate immediate measures and assess the extent of the problem, under the command of their respective Incident Officers. They will concentrate on their specific tasks within their areas of responsibility and act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisations until other levels of command are established. All this takes place at the operational level and is the normal day-to-day arrangement for responding to any incident. The command of the resources belonging to any agency and applied within a geographical area, or used for a specific purpose, will be retained by that agency. Each agency must liaise fully and continually with others employed within the same area to ensure an efficient and combined effort.

Tactical Level

A tactical level of management is introduced in order to determine priority in allocating resources, to plan and co-ordinate when a task will be undertaken, and to obtain other resources as required. Most, if not all of tactical functions will be discharged at a multi-agency Tactical Control, the location of which will be decided on the day by the Avon & Somerset Constabulary (A&SC) Tactical Commander. The Multi-agency Tactical Control ensures close consultation and liaison between various agency Incident Officers. The tactical commanders should not become involved with the activities at the scene being discharged by Incident Officers, but concentrate on the overall general management. In order to affect co-ordination, an inter-agency meeting will be held at regular intervals attended by each tactical commander and chaired by A&SC. Liaison officers from the local authority will be present at the meetings and other agencies such as the British Transport Police (BTP) and industry may be invited to attend.

If it becomes apparent the resources or expertise beyond the level of the tactical commander is required, or should there be the need to co-ordinate more than one incident/scene, it may be necessary to implement a strategic level of management.

Strategic Level

The purpose of the strategic level of management is to establish a framework of policy within which tactical commanders will work to give support to the tactical commanders by the provision of resources, to give consideration to the prioritisation of demands from any number of incident officers, to co-ordinate media messages, and to determine plans for the return to a state of normality once the incident is brought under control. The requirement for strategic management may be confined to one particular agency. However, certain incidents require a multi-agency response at strategic level in order to effect resolution. In such incidents a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) could be set up at the A&SC Headquarters at Portishead or on-line via Microsoft Teams.

A&SC, in the first instance, will be responsible for establishing and chairing the SCG, which is normally made up of a senior member from each statutory agency involved in the response. Each member of the group must be able to make executive decisions in respect of resources within their agency and have the authority to seek the aid of other agencies in support of their role. The SCG provides the focus for communication to and from the Lead Government Department. Dependent on the nature of the incident, government advisors or liaison officers may attend meetings.

The SCG will develop a co-ordinated strategy for dealing with the media, designate a media briefing centre and appoint a media briefing centre manager (normally a police press officer).

Principles for Joint Working – JESIP

Joint working between the various agencies responding to a major incident needs to be delivered with the most coherent and effective joint response possible. The JESIP (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles) joint working guidance provides the framework for interoperability amongst the emergency services, local authorities and other responder organisations.

In order to assist all responder agencies gather initial information about an incident in a consistent manner, the METHANE standard information gathering model is in place to bring structure and clarity during the early stages of an incident.

2.9.2 Recovery Phase

Work on recovery will commence as soon as possible after the start of the incident and may overlap with the Response phase. A Recovery Working Group (RWG) may be appointed to work alongside the SCG. Transition from the Response to the Recovery phase will be signalled by a change of chairmanship of the SCG from the police to the Local Authority (See Section 2.16 below).

2.10 Responsibilities of the Pipeline Operators

2.10.1 Additional Pipeline Operator Responsibilities

The relevant operator (NG or WWU) is responsible for notifying Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service's Control Room, via 999 service, of all MAHP events likely to create potential hazards to persons inside and adjoining the identified hazard area within Somerset.

In the event of a major loss of pipeline containment, the operator will also notify the Health and Safety Executive.

The operator will also be responsible for:

- the safety of and accounting for all personnel
- minimising the risk of the incident to the public
- providing both full information to the Emergency Services and specialist back-up resources as appropriate
- making safe, any clean up and final restoration
- arranging the safe disposal of any waste arising as a result of the emergency and generated by National Gas or Wales and West, under the guidance of the Environment Agency

2.11 Multi-Agency Responsibilities

The Avon and Somerset Local Resilience Forum (ASLRF) Major Incident Response Guide (MIRG), details the response responsibilities of all Category 1 and 2 responders in the LRF area and can be found on Resilience Direct in the Avon & Somerset LRF File Store, under 07. Plans.

2.12 Vulnerable Populations

Certain groups of people (eg children, the sick and elderly) may be more vulnerable than the general population. Safety of people at schools (including play groups and nursery schools), care homes and hospitals should be given special consideration if they are close to the location of a pipeline incident. Refer to Annex C for a list of schools within Emergency Planning Distance

The gas transmission licence requires that any Special Category End User... "is not deprived of adequate heating and cooking facilities where the conveyance of gas to those premises has been disconnected for the purpose of averting danger to life or property." In the event of a loss of gas supplies to Special Category End Users (whether a gas supply emergency is declared or not) the Network will ensure that adequate resources are available, and effective procedures are in place, to provide, wherever practicable, adequate alternative heating and/or cooking facilities.

Special Category End Users are those who meet the criteria specified in the PGT Licence Condition 18, paragraph 4;

(a) is a domestic customer; (and)

(b) is disabled or of pensionable age or is chronically sick; (and)

(c) does not share the occupancy of the premises with any person who is not disabled, not of pensionable age and not a minor, and

(d) is included in the list of domestic customers, information in respect of which has been provided by a gas supplier (whether directly or through a Shipper) under standard condition 17(2)(d) of the Supplier's licence,

In the event of a pipeline incident, appropriate services across Somerset Council in conjunction with the health agencies will need to consider the implications for any potentially vulnerable local individuals or populations, so that appropriate advice can be provided/action taken within reasonable time.

Careful consideration should also be given to the potential hazard from pipelines close to large gatherings, where rapid turnover of population occurs during the day, and to pipelines crossing major transport routes.

Annex B indicates some potentially hazardous sites in Somerset with large or mobile populations.

2.13 Downstream Consequences

The consequences of a pipelines incident may not be confined to the immediate hazard area. Downstream supplies of gas to domestic, commercial and industrial customers may be disrupted for a period of up to several months, long after the immediate hazard has been dealt with. Recovery of the affected communities from the effects of the incident will be co-ordinated by the local authority. A Recovery Working Group may be created at the outset of the incident, operating in parallel with the Strategic Coordinating Group.

2.14 Voluntary Organisations

Within Somerset there exists a wide variety of voluntary organisations which make themselves available to assist in the response to emergencies. These agencies can be activated via the Somerset Council Duty Emergency Planning Officer.

2.15 Media Liaison

All organisations and agencies should be prepared to receive direct enquiries and attention from the press and media, however, Avon & Somerset Constabulary will take the initial lead in media handling as part of their role in managing the co-ordination of the response.

In a declared Major Incident, the main point of reference would be from a multi-agency Media Briefing Centre, which will be at an appropriate location nominated at the time of the incident. From here basic information will be gathered and co-ordinated, official statements released and regular press conferences held. The MBC would be staffed by information officers from the emergency services and the local authority.

The press should be notified of an incident as soon as practicable. In this way it is hoped that their co-operation will be gained and they can be used as an effective means of channelling advice to the public. On the declaration of a MAHP emergency A&SC will inform the media of the incident and action the announcement of Public Information Messages by the Media.

This will then be followed by a standardised response from a Combined Media Centre, which will relay more information on the incident to the media.

Information regarding the cause of the incident will only be given by the respective Site Manager, or the assigned deputy, who will be available at the Media Centre at agreed briefing times.

All media messages by key partners need to be approved by the Media Centre Manager or lead agency representative before issue.

Visits to the scene of the incident, if allowed, will be arranged through the MBC after consultation with the A&SC and D&SFRS Incident Officers.

2.16 Recovery

Once the immediate response to an emergency nears completion, the emphasis will move to recovery and remediation. At an agreed point the local authority will take over the strategic lead in coordinating the multi-agency process of returning a community or area to normality.

The arrangements for recovery after a MAHP incident are covered in Somerset Council's Corporate Emergency Response & Recovery Plan.

Annex A –Pipeline Information

(Data derived from National Gas Maps and Pipeline Database)

Pipe Index No.	Pipeline Operator	From (Node/ boundary)	To (Node/ boundary)	LA Hosts	1:50k OS Map	GR Start (ST…)	GR End (ST…)	Length (Km)	Diameter (mm)	MPOP (bar)	Emergency Planning Distance (m)	Inner Cordon/ Thermal Hazard Range (m)	Outer Cordon (m)
1472	WWU	Hinton Charterhouse	SC	B&NES	172	772572	796582	2.4	323.9	36.4	105	105	
1472	WWU	B&NES	Wiltshire	SC	172/3	796582	805584	0.9	323.9	36.4	105	105	
1472	WWU	SC	Trowbridge	Wilts	173	805584	848586	4.6	323.9	36.4	105	105	
1482	WWU	Clutton	SC	B&NES	183	634589	625554	3.7	510	35.9	170	170	
1482	WWU	B&NES	Ston Easton	SC	183	625554	617536	2.0	510	35.9	170	170	
1482	WWU	Ston Easton	Bineger	SC	183	617536	616485	5.2	510	35.9	170	170	
1482	WWU	Bineger	Shepton Mallet	SC	183	616485	632437	5.2	510	35.9	170	170	
1482	WWU	Shepton Mallet	Ditcheat	SC	183	632437	617371	7.5	510	35.9	170	170	
1498	NG 14 Feeder Pucklechurch to Ham Street				183	712757	566353	46.26	457	70	187	187	454
1498	NG	Temple Cloud	SC	B&NES	183	616602	608556	4.8	457	70	189	189	454

Pipe Index No.	Pipeline Operator	From (Node/ boundary)	To (Node/ boundary)	LA Hosts	1:50k OS Map	GR Start (ST...)	GR End (ST...)	Length (Km)	Diameter (mm)	MPOP (bar)	Emergency Planning Distance (m)	Inner Cordon/ Thermal Hazard Range (m)	Outer Cordon (m)
1498	NG	B&NES	Dinder	SC	183	608556	592457	10.4	457	70	189	189	454
1498	NG	Dinder	Hamstreet	SC	183	592457	566353	11.5	457	70	189	189	454
1504	WWU	Barrington	SC	SC	193	379186	324227	7.1	323.9	36.4	105	105	
1504	WWU	SC	Walford Cross (N)	SC	193	324227	277278	7.1	323.9	36.4	105	105	
1508	WWU	Barrington	SC	SC	193	379186	323227	7.1	219.1	36.4	105	105	
1508	WWU	SC	Walford Cross (S)	SC	193	323227	277278	7.1	219.1	36.4	105	105	
1520	WWU	Ditcheat	SC	SC	183	617371	588326	5.4	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	SC	SC	SC	183	588326	587324	0.2	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	SC	SC	SC	183	587324	583318	0.7	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	SC	SC	SC	183	583318	580313	0.6	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	SC	Lydford	SC	183	580313	577308	0.6	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	Lydford	SC	SC	183	577308	564296	1.8	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	SC	Northover	SC	183	564296	521242	6.9	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	Northover	Ilchester	SC	183	521242	510230	1.7	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	Ilchester	Martock	SC	183/193	510230	463215	5.3	510	36.4	170	170	
1520	WWU	Martock	Barrington	SC	193	463215	379186	9.0	510	36.4	170	170	
1526	WWU	Walford Cross	Kingston St. Mary	SC	193	277278	220282	5.7	273.1	36.5	105	105	

Pipe Index No.	Pipeline Operator	From (Node/ boundary)	To (Node/ boundary)	LA Hosts	1:50k OS Map	GR Start (ST...)	GR End (ST...)	Length (Km)	Diameter (mm)	MPOP (bar)	Emergency Planning Distance (m)	Inner Cordon/ Thermal Hazard Range (m)	Outer Cordon (m)
1527	WWU	Walford Cross	Cheddon Fitzpaine	SC	193	277278	232278	5.7	168.3	36.4	85	85	
1527	WWU	Cheddon Fitzpaine	Kingston St. Mary	SC	193	232278	220282	1.2	168.3	36.4	85	85	
1527		Kingston St.Mary	SC	SC	193/181	220282	144346	10.5	168.3	36.4	85	85	
1527	WWU	SC	Crowcombe	SC	181	144346	144346	0.0	168.3	36.4	85	85	
1527	WWU	Crowcombe	Watchet	SC	181	144346	064415	11.0	168.3	36.4	85	85	
1528	NG 7 Feeder River Yeo / Ilchester			SC	183	581181	509228	9.3	610	70	288	288	609
1529	NG 14 Feeder Hamm Street / Ilchester				183	566353	509228	14.7	457	70	187	187	454
1529	NG	Hamstreet	SC	SC	183	566353	554304	5.2	457	70	288	288	454
1529	NG	MEDC	Ilchester	SC	183	554304	510230	9.0	457	70	189	189	454
1530	NG				193	379187	923864	63.15	508	70	222	222	

Pipe Index No.	Pipeline Operator	From (Node/ boundary)	To (Node/ boundary)	LA Hosts	1:50k OS Map	GR Start (ST…)	GR End (ST…)	Length (Km)	Diameter (mm)	MPOP (bar)	Emergency Planning Distance (m)	Inner Cordon/ Thermal Hazard Range (m)	Outer Cordon (m)
	14 Feeder Barrington / Kenn												
1530	NG	Barrington	Broadway	SC	193	379186	312155	7.8	508	70	222	222	
1530	NG	Boadway	Devon CC	SC	193	312155	259105	7.5	508	70	222	222	
1530	NG	SC	Yarcombe (Cotleigh)	Devon	193	259105	248096	1.5	508	70	222	222	
1531	NG 20 Feeder Ilchester / Ottery St Mary				183/193	509228 1	120957	51.99	610	70	288	288	609
1531	NG	Ilchester	Barrington	SC	183/193	509228	379187	14.5	610	70	277	277	609
1531	NG	Barrington	Devon CC	SC	193	379186	265084	15.9	610	70	277	277	609
1531	NG	SC	Stockland (Kenn)	Devon	193	265084	253072	1.6	610	70	277	277	609
2310	NG 7 Feeder Mappower / River Yeo			Dorset	183	734054	581181	21.1	610	70	288	288	609

Pipe Index No.	Pipeline Operator	From (Node/ boundary)	To (Node/ boundary)	LA Hosts	1:50k OS Map	GR Start (ST...)	GR End (ST...)	Length (Km)	Diameter (mm)	MPOP (bar)	Emergency Planning Distance (m)	Inner Cordon/ Thermal Hazard Range (m)	Outer Cordon (m)
2769	NG 14 Feeder Ilchester / Barrington			SC	183/193	509228	379187	16.0	610	70	288	288	609
Grand total	26.15km	Pipeline lengths are estimated from segment lengths (derived from NG maps). Pipeline diameter and MPOP (NG pipeline database). All grid references are in Ordnance Survey ST block.											

Annex B – Hazardous Sites

Pipeline Index/Above Groun Installation	Grid Reference	Hazard
Ilchester	537233	AGI 22km away online of Yeovilton main runway
Hinton Charterhouse	772572	AGI about 250m from Somerset Council border
1472(WWU)	775572	Runs close to Somerset Council border for 3.2Km to ST805584
1482(WWU)	622549	A39
1482	626457	A37
1482	630400	NW corner of Bath & West Showground
1482	632407	A371 & SWEB power line
1482	635428	A361
1498(NG)	582404	A361
1498	582445	A371
1498	583400	Close to Pilton Festival Site
1498	608539	A39
1504(WWU)	286259	Network Rail
1504, 1508(WWU)	278278	M5; pipelines 100m apart
1504, 1508	320232	A378; pipelines 100m apart
1508	287260	Network Rail
1520(NGT)	521241	Close to A303 for 1 Km NE
1520	532254	A372
1520	540265	A37
1520	577308	Network Rail
1526(WWU)	268278	A38
1527(WWU)	152332	A358
1527	265277	A38 & SWEB power line
1528(NG)	512219	A303
1528	524217	A37
1528	568188	A359
1529(NG)	528254	A372
1529	548289	Close to A37 fom ST540265
1529	553301	Network Rail
1530(NG)	259107	Close to A303 for 200m in both directions
1530	282132	A303
1530	332166	A358
1531(NG)	337142	A358
1531	343155	A303
2769	509228	325m from Barrington Court National Trust

Annex C – Schools within Emergency Planning Distance / Thermal Hazard Range

School	Telephone Number	Pipeline Reference	Grid Reference
Ilchester County Junior School Somerton Road Ilchester Yeovil Somerset BA22 8JL	School Key holder List held by Somerset Council EPRR	1520 (WWU)	ST 521 239
Ash C of E Primary School Main Street, Ash Martock Somerset TA12 6NS	School Key holder List held by Somerset Council EPRR	1520 (WWU)	ST 472 208
Kingsbury Episcopi Primary School Stembridge Martock Somerset TA12 6BP	School Key holder List held by Somerset Council EPRR	1520 (WWU)	ST 424 199
Cheddon Fitzpaine Primary School Rowford Taunton Somerset TA2 8JY	School Key holder List held by Somerset Council EPRR	1526 (WWU)	ST 235 279

Part 3 – Action Lists

3.1 National Gas/Wales & West Utilities

Initial Actions

On receipt of notification, confirm known details of incident; where, what, when and how if incident is a potential MAHP emergency, despatch personnel to site to investigate and confirm involvement or otherwise of MAHP

MAHP not involved: follow normal emergency procedures.

MAHP involved: establish Major Incident Team, and

Alert

- Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service via 999 service
- Avon & Somerset Constabulary
- Somerset Council
- Other responding agencies
- Health & Safety Executive, Chemical and Hazardous Installations Unit, Cardiff

Consider

- Nomination of On-Site Incident Controller
- Location of Local Incident Control Point
- Make safe - Clean up - Restoration - Safe disposal of any wastes arising from incident
- If waste disposal is required, consult Environment Agency on appropriate method to be used

Responsibility

- Isolate the danger area, provide on-site advice to Emergency Services, make safe and repair the fault.

3.2 Avon & Somerset Constabulary (British Transport Police where applicable)

Initial Actions

On receipt of notification of possible gas escape, alert Somerset Fire control and arrange appropriate Police response

On notification of a MAHP incident

Alert

- Fire and Ambulance Controls, as appropriate
- Somerset Council
- Other Category 1 and 2 responders via the Op Link process
- Establish a Multi-Agency Tactical Control
- Establish cordons
- Establish a Traffic Plan to facilitate access/egress for responding agencies and,
- If appropriate, evacuation routes
- Assist in issuing public warnings, as appropriate

Consider

- If appropriate, likely public protection measures - shelter or evacuation?
- Use of CHEMET information provided on request by Met Office.
- Cross-border liaison for any incident on or near the Constabulary boundary
- Media implications

Responsibility

- Co-ordination of the response
- Ensuring liaison between all responding agencies

3.3 Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service (DSFRS)

Initial Actions

On receipt of notification, confirm known details of incident (METHANE)
Despatch pre-determined attendance to the site

On Notification of a MAHP incident

Alert

- Police Communications Centre
- Southwestern Ambulance Service NHS Trust
- Somerset Council's Duty Emergency Planning Officer
- Environment Agency (SW Region)
- Somerset Council Public Health
- Network Rail
- National Highways
- National Gas and local electricity companies

Consider

- Use of CHEMET information obtained on request from the Met Office.
- Is there a requirement for specialist fire, rescue or decontamination equipment? If so, where can it be obtained?
- Cross-border liaison for any incident on or near the DSFRS boundary

Responsibility

- Control of operations within the Inner Cordon, in conjunction with National Gas [DMIT, On-Site Incident Controller]

3.4 South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust

Initial Actions

On receipt of MAHP alert:

- The receiving hospital nearest/most accessible to the scene of the incident
- If appropriate, notify secondary hospital(s)
- Wider NHS in accordance with the MAHP Warning Chain (p22)

Consider

- In the event of an evacuation involving specifically defined home-sick patients, where a dynamic risk assessment indicates that a displaced patient needs a level of care not available at a rest centre or other available accommodation, arrange transport to hospital.

Responsibility

- Maintain close liaison with the other responding agencies

3.5 NHS Somerset Integrated Care Board

- **Actions**
- Receive initial notification from SWAST and confirm the details of the incident
- Alert Somerset Integrated Care Board to cascade to Somerset health partners
- Alert South West UK Health Security Agency
- Provide an appropriate Strategic Liaison Officer to attend the SCG
- Establish an Incident Management Team and the Incident Co-ordination Centre (if necessary)

3.6 UK Health Security Agency, South West Centre

Action

On receipt of a MAHP alert, liaise with the Ambulance Service and provide public health advice to the other responding agencies.

3.7 Somerset Council

Via the 24/7 Duty Emergency Planning Officer

Initial Actions

On receipt of a MAHP notification, confirm known details: where, what, when and how

- Maintain close liaison with NG or WWU, the emergency services, and other responding agencies

Alert

- EPRR Manager and other emergency planning team members to standby
- Somerset Council Strategic Officer
- Somerset Highways and confirm with National Highways if M5, A303 or A36 affected
- Somerset Council Communications
- Somerset Council Adult & Children's Social Care
- Somerset Council Director of Public Health
- Somerset Lifeline and Contact Centre
- Neighbouring local authorities [potentially affected by the incident]
- BT plc [Network Operations Unit]
- Somerset Council Elected Members (Local Member/Leader)
- Voluntary Agencies
- DEFRA (via National Resilience & Emergencies Division)

Consider

- Implementing the Corporate Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (CERRP)
- Opening Local Authority Emergency Control Centre
- Is there a threat to the local public? If so, is evacuation likely?
- Locations of Schools - See Annex C
- Potential locations of rest centres, emergency transport and feeding
- Provision of an Information Service to the public
- Establishment of media liaison, in conjunction with the Police

Responsibility

- To support the Somerset Council services affected and the emergency services, as required.

3.8 Environment Agency (SW Region)

Initial Actions

- On receipt of a MAHP alert, liaise with NG/WWU and the responding services and agencies

Alert

- Wessex Water plc/Bristol Water Co, as appropriate
- Relevant environmental organisations

Consider

- Is there a disposal requirement?
- If so, advise and agree method of disposal
- Sending a representative

4.0 References and Bibliography

- Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, SI No 825.
- Guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 (HSE L82).
- Further Guidance on Emergency Plans for Major Accident Hazard Pipelines 1997 (HSE).
- Information for Local Authority Emergency Planners (National Gas Document 2008).

4.1 Distribution List

It will be the responsibility of each organisation to print and distribute enough hard copies for its purposes.

- National Gas
- Wales and West Utilities
- Somerset Council
- Avon & Somerset Constabulary
- British Transport Police
- National Highways
- Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service
- Somerset Integrated Care Board
- UK Health Security Agency - South West Centre
- Health & Safety Executive
- South Western Ambulance Service NHS Trust
- Environment Agency – South West Region
- Avon and Somerset Local Resilience Forum